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INTRODUCTION
1. The Bodell Loan to MSF/Jenson
In the summer of 2000, Appellant/Defendant Bodell Construction Company
("Bodell") made a loan of $4 million (the "Bodell Loan") to MSF Properties, L.C.
("MSF"), a company owned and managed by Marc Jenson ("Jenson").

Jenson

was a so-called hard money lender who made high risk loans at very high interest
rates.

Bodell had previously loaned MSF $1 million in another transaction.

Bodell knew that Jenson would loan the $4 million to someone else in a "hard
money" loan transaction.
The terms of the Bodell Loan were extreme: Interest of 1% per week - 52%
per annum - plus an $80,000 loan origination fee for a 30 day term.
Bodell claims that it relied upon a letter allegedly from Ben Lightner, an
employee of Bank One, in deciding to loan the $4 million to Jenson.1

The letter,

addressed "To Whom It May Concern," simply states that the proceeds of a $165
million loan from Arimex International, Ltd. to MadTrax Group, LLC will be
deposited in an account of Bank One. The letter says nothing about those funds
being available to pay Bodell. Bodell had no relationship with Bank One, had
never heard of Lightner, and made no attempt to contact Bank One or otherwise
verify the letter. Bodell made no attempt to verify any of the statements in the
letter, made no attempt to contact Arimex International, Ltd. to verify the $165
1

The authenticity of the Lightner letter is contested. For purposes of the
summary judgment motion which was granted by the trial court (and for this
appeal), Bank One assumes arguendo that the letter was authentic.

1

million loan would in fact be made, and made no investigation of Arimex to
determine its reliability and capacity to make such a large loan. Three years after
the Bodell Loan was made and after Bodell had settled its claims with MSF and
Jenson, without asserting any claim against Bank One or even having any
communications with it, Bodell filed suit against Bank One.
Prior to filing suit against Bank One, Bodell settled its claims with MSF
and Jenson for $3 million. The parties executed a Settlement Agreement dated
March 18, 2003 (the "Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement was
an accord and satisfaction that satisfied and extinguished all claims of Bodell
relating to the Bodell Loan, including the claims against Bank One.
2. Accord and Satisfaction
Bank One moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Settlement
Agreement was an accord and satisfaction, which satisfied in full the claims of
Bodell and extinguished the obligation.

Since Bodell had been paid in full,

Bodell could not assert claims against anyone else, including Bank One, relating
to the Bodell loan. The trial court agreed, granted the motion, and dismissed all
claims of Bodell.

The core issue on this appeal is whether the Settlement

Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction which bars any claims against
Bank One.
3. The "Affirm on Any Ground" Doctrine
Bank One moved for summary judgment against Bodell in the trial court on
seven separate and independent theories.

2

The trial court granted Bank One's

motion for summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction theory and declined
to rule on the other theories.
Utah appellate courts have adopted the "affirm on any ground doctrine"
which provides that if a ruling can be affirmed on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, the appellate court may sustain the ruling on such
grounds, even though such grounds or theories are not urged or argued on appeal
and were not considered or passed on by the lower court. If this Court does not
affirm the trial court ruling on accord and satisfaction, this Court may
nonetheless still affirm the trial court on any one of the other six grounds and
theories asserted in the trial court for summary judgment. These arguments were
fully briefed and argued in the trial court. If summary judgment based on accord
and satisfaction is not affirmed, this Court should then consider and affirm the
dismissal by the trial court on any of the remaining six summary judgment
arguments.
4. Damages
Bodell's appeal of this issue is not ripe and should be dismissed as
untimely.
Alternatively, the District Court's ruling was appropriate and amply
warranted. Throughout fact discovery, Bodell clearly and repeatedly stated that it
sought damages of $4 million (the principal amount it loaned to MSF Properties)
plus interest at the legal rate, less the amounts repaid by Jenson. These repeated
representations were never amended nor supplemented.

3

Then, nearly a month

after the close of fact discovery, Bodell attempted to claim vastly increased
damages through the report of its expert, Merrill Weight. These theories came as
a complete surprise to the Defendants.

The new theories raised the claimed

damages to nearly $19 million. The District Court found that, in order for the
Defendants to be able to fairly meet these new theories and the facts on which
they were premised, fact discovery would have to be re-opened and the trial
setting delayed. Because Bodell failed to disclose these new damages theories
(and the facts on which they were premised) prior to the end of fact discovery,
and because the re-opening of fact discovery would have been necessary to
contest the assumptions in Weight's report and result in a continuance of the trial,
the District Court properly excluded the new theories.
Moreover, in the event this Court considers the issue and finds there was an
abuse of discretion in not allowing the new damage theories, the District Court's
decision should be affirmed on the alternate ground (raised in the District Court
but not decided because it was rendered moot by the District Court's exclusion on
other grounds) that Weight's new theories are not supported by applicable law or
are contradicted by the facts in the record.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Bank One agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction set forth in the Brief of
Appellant.

4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Bank One disputes the wording of Issue No. 3. As phrased, it recites that
there are genuine issues of material fact.

Bank One denies that there are any

genuine issues as to any material facts and therefore summary judgment was
proper.
Bank One disputes the wording of Issue No. 5 in that it does not identify
the grounds upon which the Expert Report was stricken.
procedural, not substantive grounds.

It was stricken on

The damage theories propounded in the

Expert Report were not disclosed in Bodell's Rule 26 initial disclosures or in
repeated discovery requests asking Bodell to set forth its damages and how those
damages were calculated.

Bodell's responses to requests for admissions also

contradict the damage theories set forth in the Expert Report. A correct statement
of the issue on appeal is, "Whether the District Court erred in striking the Expert
Report of Merrill Weight, Bodell's damages expert, on the ground that the
theories of damages and facts supporting those theories were not previously
disclosed in Rule 26 initial disclosures or discovery responses and contradict
responses to requests for admissions concerning the damage theories."
Bank One also disputes the Standard of Review cited by Bodell for Issue
No. 5. Bodell asserts that the standard of review "is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness." Appellant's Brief at 2-3 {citing Pete v. Youngblood,
2006 UT App. 303, ^ 7, 141 P.3d 629, 632). The correct standard of review is
abuse of discretion. Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah

5

1997) (trial courts "are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of
discovery sanctions"; "Thus we have long held that we will not interfere unless
abuse of discretion is clearly shown").
Bank One submits the following additional issues to be presented for
review:
1.

If this Court determines that granting summary judgment in favor of

Bank One on the accord and satisfaction issue was erroneous, should this Court
then consider the other grounds and theories advocated by Bank One for summary
judgment upon which the trial court did not rule under the "affirm on any ground"
doctrine? If such grounds and theories are considered, should summary judgment
in favor of Bank One be affirmed?

Standard of Review:

The Utah Court of

Appeals may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternate ground even though
the ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its
ruling or was not passed on by the lower court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v.
Neeley Construe. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah App. 1984).
2.

Should the arguments of Bodell that the District Court erred in

striking the expert witness report of Bodell's Damages Expert be dismissed on the
ground the issue is not ripe for appeal? Standard of Review: The Utah Court of
Appeals may review an issue when a conflict over the application of a legal
provision or principle has sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal
rights and obligations between the parties. Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741,
744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

6

3.

If this Court determines the expert witness issue is ripe and that the

District Court erred in striking the Expert Report of Merrill Weight on the
grounds that the theories of damages and facts supporting those theories were not
previously disclosed in Rule 26 initial disclosures or discovery responses and
contradict responses to requests for admissions concerning the damage theories,
should the Expert Report nonetheless remain stricken on the grounds that the
damages theories asserted in the Expert Report contradict and are not supported
by legal precedent? Standard of Review: The Utah Court of Appeals may affirm
a lower court's ruling on any alternate ground even though that ground or theory
was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling or was not passed
on by the lower court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construe. Co., 677
P.2d 1120 (Utah App. 1984).
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
As noted above, Bank One disputes the standard of review asserted by
Bodell for Issue No. 5. Bank One does not dispute the other standards of review
cited by Bodell.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Paragraph 6 of Bodell's Statement of the Case contains improper
conclusions and unfair characterizations and is incomplete.

Paragraph 6

describes the production of the report of Bodell's damages expert which sets forth
calculations for a number of damage theories.

The report was filed nearly a

month after the close of fact discovery and raised three damage theories that were

7

wholly new and different from the damage theory that Bodell had consistently
and repeatedly disclosed in discovery. These new theories dramatically changed
previous damage claims, from $4 million less payments plus interest, to almost
$19 million. Besides coming as a complete surprise to Defendants, the theories
were based on facts that had previously not been the subject of discovery. The
primary reason the expert opinions were excluded was that allowing them would
have required re-opening fact discovery and the delay of the trial. Moreover, the
new theories were not valid under Utah law. Judge Kennedy allowed Bodell to
file a second (and late) report from the damages expert that was consistent with
the damage theory that Bodell had disclosed while fact discovery was open.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
1.

Marc Jenson, through his hard money lending business, named MSF

Properties, was in the business of borrowing funds and then loaning those funds
to others. Jenson profits on the difference between the interest he pays to borrow
the money and the interest he receives from lending the money. (R. 3238; Jenson
Dep. at 305.)
2.

In mid-2000, Jenson met Mark Robbins and learned that Robbins

needed $8 million to buy out Cherokee & Walker's interest in his bicycle

2

The Statement of Facts offered by Bodell is, at times, one-sided, particularly
concerning how the Lightner Letter allegedly came to be issued and the facts
bearing on the reasonableness of BodelPs alleged reliance on the Lightner Letter.
However, those facts are not relevant for this appeal.

8

businesses. After negotiations, Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8 million. (R.
3241-3242; Jenson Dep. at 43-46, 48.)
3.

In the summer of 2000, Robbins also began pursuing an opportunity

to buy the Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick Corporation.

Robbins

formed a company called MadTrax Group LLC ("MadTrax") to pursue this
acquisition.

(R. 3098-3099, 3101; Robbins Dep. at 81; 194-95; July 11, 2000

Letter from MadTrax to Brunswick.)
4.

Lincoln

Partners,

the

investment

banking

firm

representing

Brunswick in the sale of the Mongoose Division, requested information from
MadTrax about their financing sources for the proposed transaction. (R. 31133114, 3117; August 9, 2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to Trevor Larson;
Robbins Dep. at 488-489.)
5.

Robbins was a client of Bank One's private banking services at this

time. Bank One employee Benjamin Lightner was Mr. Robbins5 private banker.
Robbins testified that in August 2000, he had conversations with Lightner about
the fact that "Lincoln Partners and all of the investment bankers were, you know,
looking for verification of funding and stuff like that." Robbins testified that he
asked Lightner to draft a letter for Lincoln Partners regarding potential funding
sources for MadTrax. (R. 3120-3122; Robbins Dep. at 308-310, 316-17, 324-25.)
6.

One of Robbins' potential funding sources for the Mongoose

acquisition was a loan from Arimex Investments, Ltd. ("Arimex"). Robbins (with
Lightner in attendance on at least one occasion) had discussions with Arimex

9

about a potential loan. (R. 3125-3126, 3130; Robbins Dep. at 255-257; Lightner
Dep. at 156-57.)
7.

Robbins claims that Lightner produced a letter dated August 22,

2000 in response to the request regarding funding sources. (R. 3132; Robbins
Dep., August 22, 2000 Letter (the "Lightner Letter").3)
8.

As of the date of the Lightner Letter, Robbins believed that Arimex

was willing and able to make the Arimex Loan to MadTrax as described in the
Lightner Letter. (R. 3138-3140; Robbins Dep. at 286, 447-448.) Indeed, a loan
agreement for $165 million had been signed by Arimex. (R. 3140, 3142-3156;
Robbins Dep. at 448; Arimex Loan Agreement.)
9.

Bank One was not a party to the Arimex Loan Agreement. (R. 3142;

Arimex Loan Agreement.)
10.

The Lightner Letter was intended for Lincoln Partners in connection

with the proposed Mongoose acquisition, and was not intended for other potential
investors or for use in any other transaction. (R. 3162-3163; Robbins Dep. 324,
326-327, 446.)
11.

Jenson's plan was to fund the Robbins loan with $4 million of

Jenson's own money and $4 million from someone else. Accordingly, Jenson
approached Mike Bodell, president of Bodell Construction Company, about the
3

As noted above, the authenticity and validity of the Lightner Letter is a major,
disputed issue in this case. However, for purposes of the Motion for Summary
Judgment (and this appeal), it is assumed arguendo that the letter is authentic and
was authored by Lightner.
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possibility of borrowing $4 million that Jenson would, in turn, loan to Robbins
for the Cherokee & Walker buyout. (R. 3245, 3249; Jenson Dep. at 72-73; 102;
BodellDep. at 42-45.)
12.

Mike Bodell had known Jenson for nearly twenty years, and had

recently loaned Jenson $1 million. (R. 3252-3254; Bodell Dep. at 10, 18-20, 31.)
13.

Jenson testified that he received a copy of the Lightner Letter from

Robbins. (R. 3257, 3260; Jenson Dep. at 215-16; Robbins Dep. at 329.)
14.

On August 30, 2000, Bodell Construction Company loaned $4

million to Jenson's company, MSF Properties, LC and obtained a personal
guaranty from Jenson. Bank One was not a party to this loan. (R.3288-3289,
3295-3297; August 30, 2000 Promissory Note; August 30, 2000 Guaranty.) The
terms of the Bodell Loan required MSF to pay a loan fee of $80,000 and to pay
interest of 1% per week - 52% per year. The loan was due in 30 days. (R. 3253;
BodellDep. at 19-20.)
15.

At the time of the Lightner Letter, Bodell had no relationship

whatsoever with Bank One. Neither he nor his company was a customer and they
had no accounts at Bank One. Bodell did not even know who Lightner was.
Before making the loan to Jenson, Bodell never contacted Lightner or anyone else
at Bank One. (R. 3303-3304, 3307, 3310; BodellDep. at 11-12, 56; Weight Dep.
at 65; Bodell Disc. Resp. at 5, Resp. to Req. for Admis. No. 2.)
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16.

Bank One knew nothing about Bodell, or the loan that Bodell

planned to make to Jenson, and had no discussions with Jenson about Bodell or
Bodell Construction. (R. 3316-3318; Lightner Dep. at 39, 205, 259.)
17.

None of the funds from the Bodell Loan were paid to Bank One or

were for Bank One's benefit. (R. 3324, 3326; Bodell Disc. Resp. at 18, Response
to Int. No. 14; Robbins Dep. at 449-450.)
18.

Jenson failed to repay the Bodell Loan. (R. 2226; First Am. Compl.

19.

For many months, Bodell sought repayment from Jenson—sometimes

1118.)

going so far as to make hourly calls to Jenson. (R. 3329-3330; Jenson Dep. at
329-331.)

Jenson made several preliminary payments on the note.

(R. 3333-

3334; Jenson Dep. 333-336.)
20.

Finally, on March 18, 2003, Bodell and Jenson entered into a

Settlement Agreement. (R. 3336-3338; Settlement Agreement.) Pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement, Jenson paid Bodell $3 million and Bodell accepted those
funds as payment in full of the Bodell Loan. (R. 3336; Settlement Agreement, ^ftf
1-2.)
21.

Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement states:
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction
Company], for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all
persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it
or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective
members, managers, officers, employees and agents
(each, including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF

12

Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud,
charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations,
liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses,
costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated
(each, a "Claim"), arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party,
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related
arrangements and transactions, (b). without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, acknowledges and agrees
that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection
with the Loans, including all principal and interest
that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon,
are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full;
provided that such releases shall not apply to any
obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement
to be performed or observed after the execution and
delivery hereof.
(R. 3336; Settlement Agreement ^f 2 (emphasis added).)
22.

Four months after executing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell sued

Bank One, claiming that it was wrongfully induced to loan money to Jenson
based on the Lightner Letter. (R. 1; Compl.) The Complaint was later amended
to add a claim of fraud against Bank One. (R. 2219; First Am. Compl.)
23.

In 2005, Jenson was charged criminally by the State of Utah with

five felony counts of securities fraud and one felony count of violating the state
racketeering statute. The factual basis of these charges included the Bodell Loan.
Subsequent to the filing of Appellant's Brief, Jenson entered into a plea
agreement.

See Def.'s Statement in Advance of No Contest Plea, No Contest

Plea, and Plea in Abeyance filed May 29, 2008, in the case of State of Utah v.
Marc S. Jenson, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

13

Case No. 051905391 (the "Criminal Plea"), a copy of which is included in Bank
One's Addendum 1 at Exhibit 4. In this plea agreement, Jenson agreed to pay
Michael Bodell, the President and owner of Bodell Construction Company, $1.6
million within 36 months.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Settlement Agreement between Bodell and Jenson was an accord

and satisfaction, which satisfied in full and extinguished all claims of Bodell,
including the claims against Bank One.

The District Court correctly granted

summary judgment on this issue. An accord and satisfaction is an agreement to
give and accept some performance other than what is actually due as full
satisfaction of a claim and obligation. The law is well settled that there can be
but one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. When an accord and satisfaction is
reached, the obligation is satisfied and extinguished. The debt is gone. There
cannot be any further recovery on the obligation from anyone, including third
parties.
2.

If the Court of Appeals determines that summary judgment on the

accord and satisfaction argument was erroneous, under the "affirm on any
ground" doctrine, the Court of Appeals should then consider the other six
arguments for summary judgment which were fully briefed and argued in the
District Court but on which the lower court did not render a ruling.

Summary

judgment in favor of Bank One can be affirmed on any one of those six
arguments. It is well established that an appellate court may affirm a ruling on
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any ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the trial court and even though such ground or theory
was not considered or passed on by the trial court.
3.

The District Court's decision to strike the expert witness report of

Merrill Weight is not ripe for review on appeal. Appellate courts do not render
advisory opinions. If there is any scenario in which an issue may not need to be
addressed, the issue is not ripe for appeal. There are several issues under which
striking of the expert witness report will never be addressed even if the case is
remanded to the trial court:

summary judgment could be granted by the trial

court on one of the alternate grounds, the case could settle, or a jury could find in
favor of the Defendants. It is speculative whether the damages issue will ever be
adjudicated and therefore the issue is not ripe for an appellate review.
4.

The District Court correctly excluded the expert report of Merrill

Weight which asserted damage theories resulting in more than quadrupling the
damages disclosed in discovery, on the grounds that (i) the new damage theories
had not been disclosed in Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures or discovery responses
and contradicted responses to Requests for Admissions, (ii) they were not
disclosed until after the discovery period had closed, and (iii) allowing the new
theories of damages would necessitate the re-opening of fact discovery and rescheduling the trial. Alternatively, even if the procedural grounds for striking the
expert report were not proper, the new damage theories should be stricken on the
grounds that they contradict recognized Utah law and contradict the evidence in
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the record. Bodell's expert witness report improperly seeks damages based on
theories applicable only to purchase of a tangible asset. The concept of damages
being equal to the actual value of the asset purchased versus the amount paid due
to fraud cannot be logically applied to a loan, and courts have not applied this
theory to a loan transaction.

BodelPs expert witness report also calculated

damages based on a purported reasonable rate of return that could have been
obtained if the funds had not been invested in a fraudulent transaction.

These

calculations rely on numbers that contradict the evidence in the record and
therefore cannot be allowed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ACCORD
AND FULL SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION
WHICH SATISFIES AND EXTINGUISHES ALL CLAIMS AGAINST
BANK ONE
A.

The Settlement Agreement Constitutes an Accord and
Satisfaction.

An accord and satisfaction is an agreement to give and accept some
performance other than that which is actually due as full satisfaction of a claim or
obligation. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 20, 998 P.2d 254, 259.
Put another way, "[a]n accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a
contract agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under
the original agreement." Id. The elements of an accord and satisfaction are: "(1)
an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment
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offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the
payment as full settlement of the dispute." Id. (citing Marton Remodeling v.
Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)).
The law is well settled that there can be but one satisfaction of a debt or
obligation.

See Harris-Dudley

Plumbing Co. v. Professional

United World

Travel Assoc., Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979); Blodgett v. Zions First
National Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 903 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The rationale behind
this "one satisfaction" rule is that "the wrong is single and entire, and the injured
party is entitled to one, and only one, satisfaction, no matter how many parties
may have joined in the act." Jukes v. North American Van Lines, 309 P.2d 692,
699 (Kan. 1957); see also Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804,
807-808 (Minn. 1977) (holding that "if the injured party has accepted satisfaction
in full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again
for the same injury . . ."). To hold otherwise would allow claimants to obtain
multiple recoveries for the same injury, as Bodell attempts to do in this action.
Bodell argues that there was no unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute
over the amount due and therefore there cannot be an accord and satisfaction.
This is not an accurate characterization of the facts alleged in the Complaint or
recited in the Settlement Agreement. Bodell had numerous claims against MSF
and Jenson, both liquidated and unliquidated, in addition to the loan, which were
resolved by the Settlement Agreement.
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Bodell's original Complaint alleged numerous actions by Jenson which, if
true, would give rise to fraud and other claims against Jenson. (R. 3-4; Compl. ^[j
12-16.) The Settlement Agreement clearly and expressly provides that it is "a
full settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters between them,
including but not limited to the Loans" (4th Whereas Clause, emphasis added),
that the release extends to all claims and "allegations of fraud," "whether known
or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated ..., arising out
of all past affiliations and transactions ... including, but not limited to, the Loans
and all related arrangements and transactions," (R. 3336; Settlement Agreement ^f
(emphasis added)), "that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with
the Loans, including all principal and interest that may have been deemed to have
accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full," (id.), and
that the Settlement Agreement "is a mutual release of claims and that, following
execution of [the Settlement Agreement], no Bodell Party shall have any claim
against an MSF Party."

(R. 3337; Settlement Agreement f 5.)

Bodell

acknowledged that the Settlement Agreement covers claims beyond the $4 million
loan: "As the settlement documents demonstrate, the agreement resolved
outstanding disputes between Jenson and Bodell relating to more than just the $4
million loan in August, 2000." (R. 3522; Bodell's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for
Summ. J. Def. Mark Robbins at xxxiv ^| 92.) It is undisputedly clear and express
that Bodell had claims against MSF and Jenson for fraud, as well as on the note
and guarantee, that those fraud claims were unliquidated, that the Settlement
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Agreement was global and covered all liquidated and unliquidated claims, that
there was "a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters," and an
accord and satisfaction.
Whether Jenson and MSF disputed that the loan was owing or what the
amount owing under the loan is immaterial. In order to establish an accord and
satisfaction in Utah, the law requires, among other things, "an unliquidated claim
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due." ProMax, 2000 UT 4, \ 20, 998 P.2d
at 259 (citing Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-610 (Utah 1985)
(emphasis added)). The Settlement Agreement is not merely a release of claims
between Bodell, Jenson and MSF arising under the loan, but also settles all
claims between the parties, including "allegations of fraud" and other claims
"whether . . . liquidated or unliquidated."
The language of the Settlement Agreement also clearly demonstrates an
accord and satisfaction because without an accord and satisfaction several
paragraphs in the Settlement Agreement would be redundant.

Paragraph 2

contains two parts, designated (a) and (b). Part (a) states that Bodell releases
MSF and Jenson from any and all claims and obligations, including the loans.
Part (b) states that the loans are "fully satisfied and repaid in full." Obviously,
Parts (a) and (b) were intended to accomplish two different things. Part (b) is not
merely a release of MSF and Jenson. That was already provided in Part (a). Part
(b) must have been intended to mean something different than Part (a) - there is
no other way to reconcile these provisions. See LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins,
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Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a contract should be
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which
terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so."). Part (b) provides that the
debt is "fully satisfied and repaid in full."
there was an accord and satisfaction.

The inescapable conclusion is that

The absence of any provision reserving

rights against third parties from the Settlement Agreement further demonstrates
the intent that all loans were "fully satisfied and repaid in full."
Because of the clarity of the Settlement Agreement, "extrinsic evidence
need not and should be considered. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108
(Utah 1991) ("A court may only consider extrinsic evidence, if after careful
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain."). There is no
reservation of rights against others. The only conclusion is that claims based on
the Bodell Loan are extinguished and satisfied and cannot now be asserted against
Bank One or anyone else. Bodell has no remaining claims on the Bodell Loan.
If, however, the Court finds it necessary to review extrinsic evidence, the
clear intent of Bodell, MSF and Jenson that the Settlement Agreement constitute
an accord and satisfaction is evidenced by Jenson's statements in the Criminal
Plea:
7.
On March 18, 2003, Mr. Jensom MSF
Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF
Properties made a $3 million payment to Bodell and
Bodell signed an accord and satisfaction in which he
waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson and MSF
Properties relating to transaction among them.
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8.
In May, 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties
and Bodell entered into an agreement (the "Bodell
Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson
and MSF Properties have agreed to provide additional
consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confirmed will
be satisfactory to him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson
in connection with the loans made by Bodell to MSF
Properties and Mr. Jenson. Bodell has also confirmed
that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided
herein.
(Bank One's Addendum 1 at Ex. 4; Criminal Plea at 4 (emphasis added).)
Bodell confuses the doctrines of accord and satisfaction with release and
misconstrues Bank One's argument as relying on the release contained in the
Settlement Agreement, when in fact Bank One relies on the accord and
satisfaction contained in the Settlement Agreement.

Release is a different

doctrine and concept and should not be confused with accord and satisfaction. A
release excuses performance by a party. Accord and satisfaction extinguishes a
claim.
A release is a waiver of claims against a party. Black's Law Dictionary
1292 (7th Ed. 1999) (A release is "the act of giving up a right or claim to the
person against whom it could have been enforced"). An accord and satisfaction,
on the other hand, "arises when the parties to a contract agree that a different
performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed
upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement."
ProMax, 2000 UT 4, \ 20, 998 P2d at 259.

The U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois clearly explained the difference:
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"There are two

different things:

an accord and satisfaction is a contractual method of

discharging a debt or claim by some performance other than that which was
originally due; a release is a contract whereby a party abandons a claim or
relinquishes a right that could be asserted against another." Doyle's Construction
& Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's International, Inc., 144 F.Supp. 2d 969, 976 (N.D.
111. 2001); see also Thompson v. Nicholson, 1994 WL 44428 *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994) (Release and accord and satisfaction "differ from one another in that a
release is a relinquishment by the creditor or holder of a right, and an accord and
satisfaction is a discharge of a claim or demand by or for the debtor or person
liable, by some means other than its full performance.").
An accord and satisfaction is a substitute agreement similar to a novation.
The Settlement Agreement replaces the obligations under the note.

The

Settlement Agreement expressly states that the loan obligations are "fully
satisfied and repaid in full."

The note is discharged by the Settlement

Agreement. There is no longer any obligation owing on the note. If Jenson had
failed to pay the $3,000,000.00 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Bodell's
remedy would have been for breach of the Settlement Agreement, not to sue on
the note.

Upon reaching an accord and satisfaction, the note is gone.

discharged.
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It is

B.

The Accord and Satisfaction Applies to Bank One Because It
Extinguished All Claims.

Bodell argues that even if an accord and satisfaction was reached as
between Bodell, MSF and Jenson, that accord and satisfaction would not apply to
Bank One because Bank One was not a party to the Settlement Agreement,
relying on Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980)
and Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1987). Neither Messick nor
Killian stands for the proposition that an accord and satisfaction does not apply to
a third party.
In Killian, the plaintiff and defendant dissolved their dairy partnership by
entering into new agreements.

The plaintiff subsequently learned that the

partnership incurred a loss of over $100,000. The plaintiff asked the defendant to
contribute to the partnership losses. The defendant declined, the plaintiff sued
him, and the defendant argued that an accord and satisfaction occurred with the
new agreements. The trial court disagreed and held that the defendant was liable
for half of the partnership's losses. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision because, inter alia, the new agreements "did not purport to be an accord
and satisfaction of all liabilities between the parties under the partnership
agreement." Id. at 1201. The court said nothing about whether a non-party to an
agreement can or cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction.
In Messick, the plaintiff bought a truck from the defendant and then leased
it back to the defendant.

The plaintiff eventually sold his truck back to the
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defendants

for a total that, according to a written agreement, "was in

consideration of defendant's acquiring all equity and interest that plaintiff had in
the vehicle." The plaintiff then sued the defendant for money owed on the truck
under the preexisting lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The trial court held for the defendant, holding that the parties entered into a
purchase agreement for the truck that was an accord and satisfaction. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, stating that "Defendant failed
to prove that it had made known to plaintiff an intent to consider plaintiffs
release of defendant's equity . . . as an accord and satisfaction of all plaintiff's
claims against defendant . . . .," i.e., a claim for unpaid amounts under the lease
agreement. Messick, 615 P.2d at 1278. As with Killian, this case says nothing
about whether a non-party to an agreement can or cannot benefit from an accord
and satisfaction.
Other cases have found that an accord and satisfaction bars claims against
third parties who are not parties to the agreement creating the accord and
satisfaction.

In Luxemburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 807-808

(Minn. 1977), the Court ruled, "if the injured party has accepted satisfaction in
full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again
for the same injury . . . ." In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that an amount
less than the full damages may represent "full compensation" where the lesser
amount reflects a discount due to the fact that liability is disputed. Id. at n.l; see
also Havard v. Kemper National Insurance Companies, 945 F. Supp. 953 (D.

24

Miss. 1995) (An accord and satisfaction between the insured and the insurer
discharged all claims of plaintiff and therefore plaintiffs

claims against

appraisers were dismissed).
If the loan has been satisfied, whether by accord and satisfaction or
otherwise, no damages are suffered.

Since Bodell has no damages, it cannot

make a claim against anyone, including third parties such as Bank One.
C.

The Liability Reform Act Has No Applicability to This Case.

Bodell relies on Section 78-27-42 of the Utah Liability Reform Act which
provides that "[a] release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so
provides." Appellant's Brief at 23-24. Bodell's reliance on the Liability Reform
Act is misplaced and irrelevant to the issue presented by Bank One. Bank One
does not argue that the release by Bodell of MSF and Jenson contained in the
Settlement Agreement operates as a release of Bank One.

Rather, Bank One

maintains that the Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction of
the obligations owed to Bodell.
D.

Application of the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction is not
Unfair.

Bodell argues that application of the accord and satisfaction doctrine would
be fundamentally unfair, suggesting that historically courts have not clearly
distinguished accord and satisfaction from release and the Utah Liability Reform
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Act "appears" to have been intended to alter the common law rule of accord and
satisfaction. Id. at 24.
Bodell does not - and cannot - point to any language in the Liability
Reform Act supporting the argument that the Liability Reform Act also applies to
accord and satisfaction.

Bodell's argument is basically that because these

doctrines overlap and Bodell believes lawyers who draft agreements may have
been incorrectly assuming that the Act includes accord and satisfaction, the Act
should be interpreted to include accord and satisfaction. This is not a sufficient
argument to justify interpretation of the Act to include accord and satisfaction.
II.

EVEN IF THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION RULING OF THE
DISTRICT COURT IS NOT AFFIRMED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF BANK ONE SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER THE
"AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND" DOCTRINE
Utah appellate courts "will affirm a trial court's decision whenever [they]

can do so as a proper ground, even though it was not the ground on which the
trial court relied in its ruling.''

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating

v. Neeley

Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984). The law is well settled that:
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the
lower court.
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A.J. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc., Inc., 461 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah
1969) (emphasis added); see also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ff 12-15, 52 P.3d
1158 (affirming the rule cited in A.J. Limb).4
The reasons and policy considerations behind the "affirm on any ground"
doctrine are obviously judicial economy and to speed the administration of
justice.

Id. f 13 n.3, 1162 n.3 (stating that the goal of judicial economy is

embodied in the "affirm on any ground" rule).
Bank One sought summary judgment against Bodell in the trial court on
seven separate and independent theories: (i) There was no misrepresentation of a
past or presently existing fact; (ii) Any representations were not false; (iii) Any
reliance by Bodell was unreasonable; (iv) All claims were previously satisfied by
the accord and satisfaction; (v) Bank One did not have the required pecuniary
interest in the Bodell Loan (negligent misrepresentation claim only); (vi) Bank
One was not in a superior position

to ascertain

the

facts

(negligent

misrepresentation claim only); and (vii) Bodell was not a foreseeable recipient of
the alleged Bank One letter. Each of these theories was fully briefed and argued

Bailey also addresses several other points under the "affirm on any ground
doctrine" but those points are not relevant to this appeal (if the alternate ground
for affirmance may come as a surprise to the parties, in certain circumstances the
parties should be given an opportunity to address and argue the alternate grounds;
the reviewing court may not make findings of fact and cannot consider evidence
to find facts). Id. at f 19, 1164. The alternate grounds asserted by Bank One
were fully briefed and argued in the District Court and do not require any new
argument and do not require the appellate court to make any new findings of fact.
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to the trial court. The entire briefing by all parties on these issues is provided to
the Court in Bank One Addendum 2.
The trial court granted Bank One's motion for summary judgment on the
accord and satisfaction theory and declined to rule on the other theories.
The Bodell case is a textbook example of where the "affirm on any ground"
doctrine should be applied. If this Court determines that the District Court erred
in granting summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction argument, then this
Court should consider the remaining summary judgment arguments and determine
if summary judgment in favor of Bank One should be entered based on any one of
these alternative arguments.
Bank One submits that summary judgment is proper on each of these
arguments and the ruling of the District Court should be affirmed on any one of
these alternate grounds.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE THE NEW
DAMAGE THEORIES IS NOT RIPE FOR APPEAL
It is well established that an appellate court will not consider an issue on

appeal if the issue is not ripe. An issue is not ripe if there is any future scenario
in which the appellate court would not decide the issue.
In Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, 106 P.3d 705, the defendant was
granted leave to amend an answer to plead an affirmative defense of "afteracquired evidence." The plaintiff brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the
decision granting leave to amend and also requesting the Supreme Court to
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determine whether Utah law recognizes the affirmative defense.

Id. \ 3, 706.

The Supreme Court limited its decision to determining whether there had been an
abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment. The Court stated:
We ... decline the invitation to express additional views
about the scope and application of the after-acquired
evidence defense. To do so would be premature and at
odds with our time-honored practice of deciding only
questions which are ripe. . . .
This case comes to us on interlocutory appeal. It has
not matured to the extent that we can know with
certainty the facts and law which shape its final
outcome. As such, any direction we may provide
concerning the characteristics of the after-acquired
evidence defense would be little more than an advisory
opinion and may ultimately prove to be irrelevant, or
even flawed, after a final judgment has been rendered in
this case.
Id. HI 4-5, 706.
Similarly, in State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, 987 P.2d 39, the Supreme Court
declined to hear the challenge raised by defendants in a criminal matter who
argued that there were constitutional defects in the sentencing structure
applicable to the crimes with which they were charged (concerning whether a
particular sentence could be imposed by a less than unanimous jury).
Supreme Court explained its holding that the issue was not ripe as follows:
[T]here are several possible circumstances under which
we would not need to address the constitutionality of
[the statute]. Allen and Ortiz may both be found not
guilty; Allen and Ortiz may both be found guilty and
unanimous juries could agree that life without the
possibility of parole is the proper sentence; Allen and
Ortiz may both be found guilty but there might not be
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The

ten votes to sentence either defendant to life without the
possibility of parole; and finally, Allen and Ortiz may
both be found guilty of a lesser offense.
Id. Tj 4, 40-41. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473
U.S. 568, 580-581 (1985) (claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon
"contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all") (citations omitted); Texas v. U.S., 523 U.S. 296, 302 (1998) (too
speculative whether issue presented will ever need solving and therefore deeming
issue not ripe for adjudication).
In this case, there are several possible circumstances under which this
Court would not need to address the damages issues, even if the case were
remanded for trial. The trial court might enter summary judgment for Defendants
on one of the alternate grounds, the case could settle, or the jury might find
against Bodell.

Under any of these possibilities, the issue of damages would

never be reached, in which case any decision by this Court on the pending
damages issue would be merely advisory.
The arguments of Bodell on damages are not ripe and should be dismissed.
IV.

IF THIS COURT FINDS THE ISSUE IS RIPE FOR REVIEW ON
APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION EXCLUDING THE
NEW DAMAGE THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Bodell claims the District Court erred in excluding new damage theories in

a report first offered by its damages expert, Merrill Weight, after the close of fact
discovery. Bodell argues that the report was timely, the theories were valid and,
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even if Bodell did improperly submit new theories, the District Court should have
imposed a "less draconian sanction." Appellant's Brief at 26.
The District Court's decision to exclude the new damages theories should
be affirmed for two reasons. First, the theories were wholly new and raised new
fact issues that had not been explored while fact discovery was open. Litigating
the theories would have required the re-opening of fact discovery and a
substantial delay in the trial date would have resulted.

Thus, the decision to

exclude comported with sound case management practice and fairness and it
certainly was not an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the District
Court's willingness to allow Bodell additional time to prepare a second report
from Weight based on the one damage theory that had been properly disclosed.
Additionally, the District Court's decision to exclude the new theories can be
affirmed on the alternative ground that the new theories are not allowable under
applicable law or do not comport with the facts in the record.
A.

The District Court Properly Excluded The New Damage
Theories.

Throughout discovery in this case, Bodell maintained that its damages were
the amount of money loaned, $4 million, plus interest at the legal rate. A month
after the close of discovery, in submitting an expert witness report, Bodell for the
first time asserted new theories of damages which skyrocketed Bodell's damage
claims to as much as $18,970,571. Additional fact discovery would be required
for Bank One to respond to these new theories.
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Allowing the additional

discovery would have resulted in rescheduling the trial date.

The trial court

properly ruled that these new damage theories were not timely, were not properly
raised, and struck the expert witness report. This sanction was appropriate and
justified under the circumstances.

Bodeli was permitted to submit a second

expert witness report demonstrating calculation of damages of $4 million plus
interest at the legal rate.
1. BodelPs Discovery Responses Consistently Disclosed That It
Was Seeking Only $4 Million Plus Interest At The Statutory
Rate Less Payments Received.
On January 27, 2004, Bodeli served its Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures,
stating in part: "Bodeli's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with
interest at the legal rate, less the payment received from MSF."

(Bank One

Addendum 1 at Ex. 6.) Bodeli never amended or supplemented these disclosures
to include other damages calculations.
On September 22, 2004, Bodeli provided its most expansive explanation of
its damages in responses to the first discovery requests of Defendant Mark
Robbins, which asked Bodeli to describe in detail its damages and give a detailed
calculation: "Bodeli has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million
representing the amount that Bodeli was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to
in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodeli also contends that it is entitled to
recover interest at the legal rate." (Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 7.)
never supplemented or amended this response.
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Bodeli

Similarly, on April 9, 2004, Bodell served responses to Defendant
Cherokee & Walker's first set of discovery, asking the amount Bodell claimed
was owing by Cherokee & Walker:

"Bodell contends it is entitled to recover

from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount
that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount
Bodell contends Cherokee & Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is
also entitled to recover interest at the legal rate." (Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex.
8.) Bodell never supplemented this response.
On June 14, 2004, Bodell responded to a Request for Admission from Bank
One as follows:
REQUEST [FOR ADMISSION1 NO. 7: Admit that if
Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts Bodell is
entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal
amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell Loan,
interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah
Code §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not
seeking punitive damages against Bank One. However,
discovery is in its infancy and Bank One had not been
forthcoming with all of the information requested.
Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend the
complaint and seek punitive damages should subsequent
discovery so justify
(Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 9.)
On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental response to Bank One's
Request for Admission No. 7, just described, as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is
in its infancy and Bank One has not been forthcoming
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with all of the information requested. Accordingly,
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek
punitive damages should subsequent discovery justify
such relief.
(Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 10.)

Bodell did not further supplement this

response.
The foregoing demonstrates that throughout the course of discovery,
Bodell clearly and repeatedly gave a single description of its damages, which was
$4 million plus interest at the statutory rate.
2. After Fact Discovery Closed, Bodell's Expert Report Raised
New Damage Theories Based on Facts That Had Not Been The
Subject of Discovery.
Weight's report was served June 11, 2007, almost a month after fact
discovery had closed on May 18, 2007. Expert Report of Merrill Weight, June
11, 2007.

(R. 2992-3018.)

It included several alternative new theories for

calculation of damages including the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the
"Modified Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the "Comparable Rate of Return" theory,
and consequential damages. (R. 2992-3002.) The new theories were not simply
new legal theories applied to facts that had been the subject of discovery.
Instead, they raised whole new areas of potential factual disputes that had not
been investigated before fact discovery closed.
As argued below, the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" and "Modified Benefit
of the Bargain Rule" theories should not be applied in the context of a loan. (R.
2884-2885; Mem. in Supp. of (1) Mot. to Exclude Expert Test, of Merrill Weight
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and (2) Mot. to Reopen Fact Discov. and Extend Expert Deadlines at 4-5.) See,
e.g., McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting a benefit of the bargain measure of damages for fraud in inducing a
loan, explaining that the "benefit-of-the-bargain method [is not] particularly apt
where, as here, no property changed hands and a value comparison is not
available.").
This measure of damages only makes sense when a tangible asset is sold or
transferred. If applied to a loan, it would require determination of the fair market
value of a loan as actually made and the fair market value of that same loan made
based on the alleged misrepresentations.5

Fair market value would be what

someone would pay to purchase the loan from the lender. Determination of this
fair market value would require an analysis of the terms of the loan,
creditworthiness of the borrower, sources of repayment, credit history of the
borrower, and similar factors. This measure makes no sense in a loan transaction.
Benefit of the bargain is not an appropriate measure of damages for a loan
transaction.

5

"[I]n an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the difference
between the actual value of what the party received and the value thereof if it had
been as represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule." Lamb v. Bangart, 525
P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974); see also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) ("[BJenefit of the bargain damages are, in effect, a refund to the
purchaser of the overpayment in order to bring the effective purchase in line with
the actual value received. Both parties thereby received the full benefit of the
bargain.").
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If a benefit of the bargain measure of damages was allowed, it would
require significant factual discovery into the factors listed above. Because this
theory was never disclosed in initial disclosures or discovery, none of this
discovery was done.
Bodell's expert witness report also includes $127,281.18 in "consequential
damages" representing "the amount of interest Bodell was required to pay on
money it was forced to borrow against its line of credit as a result of not
receiving the payments promised in connection with the August 2000 Jenson
loan." (R. 3000; Weight Report at 7.) Bodell specifically conceded that this is a
new fact that had not previously been disclosed. (R. 3394; Bodell Opp'n to Mot.
to Exclude Weight's Report at 2 n.4.)

No discovery was conducted on this

undisclosed issue.
Bodell's "Comparable Rate of Return" analysis estimates what Bodell
"could have achieved . . . had it invested elsewhere the four million dollars it was
instead induced to loan to Jenson." (R. 3002; Weight Report at 9.) Weight then
"assume[s] a rate of 18% as a comparable rate of return available through other
investments." Id.

With this assumption of an 18% return, Weight calculates

Bodell's damages at $7,510,352.96. Id. The 18% rate of return assumption is
based on loans made by MJB Ltd., a Bodell Family Partnership, and James H.
Bodell, a Bodell shareholder, not on loans by Bodell. (R. 3001; Weight Report at
8.) Again, no discovery was conducted on these issues because the theory was
never disclosed.
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Bodell conceded at oral argument in the trial court that Defendants would
need at least some additional fact discovery on its new theories: "I agree with Mr.
Tufts, I can see his position, I will concede that were I in that chair, I would have
asked different questions of Mr. Weight and Mr. Bodell in their depositions about
the consequential damages and the interest rate, the interest that we were drawing
on . . ." (R. 6257.)
Allowance of these new theories would have required the re-opening of
discovery and significant new discovery by the Defendants.

This additional

discovery would have resulted in a substantial postponement of the trial. It was
well within the discretion of the Court to deny these new damage theories under
these circumstances.

See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen

Constr., 1999 UT App 87, If 36, 977 P.2d 518, 526 ("Because the trial judge deals
primarily with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has great latitude
in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's
business."); Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791-792 (5th Cir. 1990)
(excluding expert witness testimony because it was not timely provided before
the fact discovery deadline, because it would have required opposing counsel to
incur additional litigation expense, and because it would have delayed the trial);
Finwall v. City of Chicago, 239 F.R.D. 504, 507 (N.D. 111. 2006) (excluding
expert witnesses not timely

disclosed

because there was no

meaningful

opportunity to submit rebuttal expert reports and reopen discovery before trial).
See also Robert Matthew Lovelin, A Practitioner's
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Guide: Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a) -Automatic

Disclosure, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 225 (1996) (stating

that a district court may also sanction a party's failure to comply with expert
disclosure requirements by excluding evidence in order to "highlight the
importance of Rule 26(a)(2), and to serve as an incentive to comply with the
rule").
3. The District Court Properly Excluded BodelPs Late Disclosed
Damage Theories.
The District Court found "that the defendants will suffer prejudice if
Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at trial because these
claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories.
Bodell has offered no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to
the close of fact discovery." (R. 4766-4769; Ord. Granting Def. Robbins' Motion
to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight at 2.) This holding was fully
justified. See Utah. R. Civ. P. Rule 37(f) ("If a party fails to disclose a witness,
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to
amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall
not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose."); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App. 80, | 26,
977 P.2d 508, 514 (the trial court was well within its right to limit an expert
witnesses' testimony because party failed to supplement interrogatories); Am.
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Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App. 16, 41 P.3d 1142 (refusing to
allow evidence relating to the total amount owed by the defendant where plaintiff
failed to supplement its response to defendant's request for production); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37, Advisory Committee Notes ("This automatic sanction provides strong
inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to
use as evidence."). 6
Clear prejudice to Defendants would have resulted from the introduction of
substantial new factual issues that had not been investigated while fact discovery
was open. Although Bodell repeatedly points out that Weight's report was served
with seven weeks of expert discovery remaining, it omits to mention that fact
discovery had been closed for almost a month.

Defendants would have been

forced to reopen fact discovery or go to trial unprepared on the new theories.
Indeed, Defendants moved, in the alternative to striking the new theories in the
Weight report, to re-open fact discovery. (R. 2871-2873.) Additionally, if fact
discovery had been re-opened, the District Court said at oral argument that the
trial setting would have to be postponed: u [W]e've got a trial date and it seems to
me that this is an extensive period of time [for the additional fact discovery] and
if we end up striking that trial date because of additional discovery, we're going

6

"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules."
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (Utah 1994).
Rule 37(f), Utah R. Civ. P., and Rule 37(c)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., are substantially
similar.
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to be moving it back into probably March of next year, that's where we are in our
calendar right now for that length of trial." (R. 6257.)
The District Court's order excluding Weight's novel theories was amply
justified, particularly in light of the applicable standard of review. "A trial judge
is given a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient manner
to conduct court business. The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the
status of his cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the
parties."

Morton v. Continental Baking Company, 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah

1997). The Utah Supreme Court also held:
Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties
and the discovery process, they are given broad
discretion regarding the imposition of discovery
sanctions. Thus, we have long held that we will not
interfere unless abuse of that discretion is clearly
shown. We will find that a trial court has abused its
discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if
there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.
Id. at 274 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The District Court's
decision here was not an abuse of discretion, nor was its decision "draconian," as
Bodell argues.

The court was simply acting to protect Defendants against

obvious prejudice.

Although not required to do so, the District Court made

accommodation for Bodell to prepare an amended (and late) report by Weight that
calculated damages based on the damage theory previously disclosed.
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B.

The District Court's Decision Excluding The New Damage
Theories Should Be Affirmed On The Alternative Ground That
The New Theories Contradict Applicable Law

In the event this Court finds there was an abuse of discretion, the District
Court's decision should nevertheless be affirmed on the alternate ground that
Weight's new theories are not supported by applicable law or are contradicted by
the facts in the record. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction
Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984) (appellate courts "will affirm a trial court's
decision whenever [they] can do so as a proper ground, even though it was not the
ground on which the trial court relied in its ruling").

The "Benefit of the

Bargain" rule and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain" rule proposed by Weight
contradict recognized Utah law. The "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory is not
proper because evidence in the record contradicts the assumptions made in the
theory.

These arguments were raised in the trial court but were not decided

because they were rendered moot by the District Court's exclusion on other
grounds. The arguments may be found in Bank One's Addendum 3.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised in Bodell's appeal fail for multiple reasons.

The

Settlement Agreement between Bodell, MSF and Jenson was clearly and
unequivocally an accord and satisfaction. Bodell received $3 million, in addition
to other previous payments. An accord and satisfaction extinguishes all claims the obligation is paid in full and no longer exists. No claims can be brought
against anyone, including Bank One.

41

If this Court determines that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment on the accord and satisfaction, then this Court should apply the "affirm
on any ground" doctrine and affirm the action of the District Court on any one of
the other six summary judgment arguments presented to the District Court.
BodelPs appeal of the exclusion of damages evidence is not ripe for appeal.
In any event, the District Court appropriately excluded the expert report.

The

decision of the District Court granting summary judgment should be affirmed.
Dated: June 30, 2008
HOLLAND & HART LLP

'John A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor
by merger to Bank One, N.A.
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SCHEDULE OF BANK ONE ADDENDA
1.

Key Documents (Attached to Appellee's Brief)

2.

Trial Court Pleadings on Summary Judgment Motions (Separate Volume)

3.

Trial Court Pleadings on Motion to Strike Expert Witness Report of Merrill
Weight (Separate Volume)
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I certify that on June 30, 2008, I served a copy of the foregoing document
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James S. Jardine
Matthew L. Lewis
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Hand Delivery

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 S. State Street #1400
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JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement') b entered into this 18th day of March,
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTJON COMPANY, a Utah corporation.("BCC"), MICHAEL
BODELL, an individual ("Bodcir'), MARC S. JENSON, an individual ("Jensen"), and MSF
PROPERTIES, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF").
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain Joans to MSF (the ^Loans'1)', arid
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under the Loans; and
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts outstanding under the Loans,
but is currently uVdefault under the Loans; and
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which art hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows:
L
Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of tills Agreement, MSF has caused
S3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of
such funds.
2.
• Each of Bodell-and BCC, for himself, itself their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each,
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Part/') from any and all claims, allegations of fraud,
charges, demands, losses,- damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "CZffirxf'), arising out of all past affiliations
and transactions among Bodell, BCCand any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and
repaid in full; provided \\\z\ suoh releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in
mis Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof,
3.
Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf')> from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, the Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions; provided that juch releases shajl not apply TO any obligation of
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery
hereof.
4.
Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof it
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of tin's Agreement, the consideration exchanged
herein, and all other matters in connection with this Agreement; provided thai any party may (upon
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF, Jenson,
Bodell and BCC have definitively settled all matters between them as of me date hereof and provided,
further, that each party may disclose such kerns in confidence as appropriate to their rcspcctiYcrtax advisors.
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5.
Each of the parties hereto understand and agree thai this is a mutual release of claims and
that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Parry and
no MSF Parry shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSF's requirement to pay
BCC S3 million asset forth herein.
6.
Tho parties shall execute and detiver all documents, provide all information, and take or
forbear from all such action as may be necessary or appropriatetoachieve the purposes of this Agreement
7.
Each of BCC and MSF represents and warrants to the other parties hereto that (a) this
Agreement has been duly approved by all necessary corporate or limited liability company action and tliat
the person executing this Agreement on its behalf has been duly auftorized to do so and (b) they have had
opportunity to consult with legal counsel of their choosing in connection with entering into this Agreement
1.
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of tho Stale of Utah. This Agreement
shiJl be binding upon and shall inure to ihc benefit of the parties and their heirs, successors and assigns.
In the event legal action is commenced by any party to enforce or interpret this Agreement, the prevailing
party or parties in any such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-preyailing party or parties its
or their reasonable aitorncy fees and costs, This Agreement dial] be construed as though all parties had
drafted ft. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prioT negotiations, representations, understandings,
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter
hereof. The parties agree that this Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts and, upon such
execution, all the counterparts taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement Counteroarts
and signatures transmitted by facsimOe^hall be valid.and effective as originals.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first sot forth
above.
"Bodeir:

^U/f>kIW

Michael Bodell

"BCC:
Bodell Construction Company

By;

Name;
Title;

JMM^A^^

niwm^JJ/&5q
&&&C
ttmi^ur

"Jcnson":

U

MSP;

MSF Properties, L»C.
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BANK ONE BROADWAY
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WEALTH M A N A G E M E N T

August 22, 2000

To;

Whom it may concern

Re:

MadTrax Group, LLC

^ <££

Gentlemen;
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members
Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") "will be depositing $165,000,000 into
Bank One, Utah NA, The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax
Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability'company and Arimex Investments^ LTD., a
Bahamian, corporation. The si?m of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest
bearing account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
Under&igned,

"TOSMrkdvisor.
Private Banking .GroOp

Bodell v. Robbins
Deposition Exhibit No. 402
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iBm^in Jones &Pinegar

Richard D. Burbidge (#0492)
Jefferson W. Gross (#2278)
Robert J. Shelby (#8319)
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,

EXPERT REPORT OF MERRILL
WEIGHT

vs.
MARKH. ROBBPNS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
Defendants.

Civil No. 030917018
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing EXPERT REPORT OF MERRILL WEIGHT was hand-delivered to:

John A. Beckstead
HOLLAND & HART
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this \ 1

Jeffrey M. Jones
David W. Tufts
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
1 LI E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt-Lake City, Utah 84111

day of June, 2007.
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

Bodell Construction Company, a Utah corporation
v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et. al.
Submitted by:

Merrill Weight
Date of Report
June 11,2007

I.

INTRODUCTION
I am the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction Company

("Bodell Construction"). In that capacity, I have been asked to calculate the damages
suffered by Bodell Construction as a result of the events described in a lawsuit filed in
Third District Court, State of Utah, styled Bodell Construction Company v. MarkH.
Robbins, et al, Civil Case Number 030917018.
This report and the attached schedules describe and reflect my work in connection
with calculating the damages, summarize my opinions concerning the amount of those
damages, and provide the bases for those opinions. The opinions and findings expressed
herein are based upon my own investigation and work to date, as well as the facts of the
discreet transactions at issue in this case as I understand them. My opinions and findings
are also based upon my review of the documents and information itemized in Exhibit 1 of
this report.
In preparing this report, I have made no assumptions concerning who is liable for
the claims alleged by Bodell Construction. While I have made certain assumptions about
the facts of this case for purposes of my analysis, I do not intend to opine on the veracity
of any specific evidence other than that with which I have personal knowledge and
information by virtue of being a fact witness to some of the events at issue in this case. I
may supplement, update or modify this report at a later date if additional information
becomes available.
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II.

QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESS
I have a B.S. degree with a major in Accounting and a minor in Business

Management from Brigham Young University. I am a Certified Public Accountant
licensed to practice by the State of Utah.
I am presently employed as the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction. I
have held that position since September 1, 2000. In that capacity I am responsible for all
accounting functions, financial reporting functions, and financial management for the
Company. I have considerable experience in managing investments of the Company and
in preparing financial analyses. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of my resume. I have not
testified as an expert at trial within the last four years. I have, however, testified in
various depositions and in arbitrations and trials purely as a fact witness within the last
four years.
III.

CASE BACKGROUND
The following is a summary of certain events leading up to this litigation and is

not meant to be testimony regarding the factual background of the case; it simply serves
as a frame of reference for the opinions that follow this section.
Michael Bodell met Marc Jenson ("Jenson") many years ago when the two were
neighbors. After a period of many years without much interaction, Jenson approached
Mr. Bodell in early summer 2000 with a business opportunity. Jenson told Mr. Bodell
that he operated a "hard money" lending company, MSF Properties, that provided highreturn, short-term bridge loans. Jenson persuaded Mr. Bodell to cause Bodell
Construction to lend MSF Properties one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in June 2000 for
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use in hard money loans to third-parties. The terms of the June 2000 loan agreement are
the subject of a Private Placement Agreement and a Guaranty, both dated June 23, 2000.
Benjamin Lightner, who was a Wealth Advisor in the Private Banking Group of
Bank One (a predecessor in interest of Chase), and its authorized agent, authored a letter
(the "Letter") dated August 22, 2000, addressed "To Whom it may concern" and
representing that:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark Robbings
and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One,
Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a Bahamian
corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
undersigned.
Lightner drafted the Letter at Mark Robbins' ("Robbins") request. Bank One and
Lightner acknowledge these representations were false at the time they were made.
Bodell alleges that Lightner and Bank One made those representations knowing that they
were false or, at a minimum, that Lightner and Bank One negligently made those
misrepresentations. Bodell further alleges that Lightner knew or could reasonably
foresee that potential third-party lenders, a class that included Bodell, could see and rely
on the Letter and, as a result, provide financing to Robbins, Jenson or MadTrax Group.
Jenson obtained a copy of the Letter from Robbins and used it to induce Bodell to make a
four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan in August 2000. Bodell claims it reasonably
relied upon the representations and assurances made in the Letter in making the loan.
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Bodell would not have made the loan absent the Letter from Bank One and the
representations contained therein.
Consistent with the stated purpose of the loan, Jenson combined the four million
dollars from Bodell Construction with another four million dollars from another source
and loaned a total of eight million dollars ($8,000,000.00) to Robbins to retire a personal
loan and repurchase a fifty percent interest in Robbins' bicycle business. Robbins
thereafter defaulted on the Jenson loan, and Jenson in turn defaulted on the four million
dollar loan from Bodell Construction.
Jenson made several payments to Bodell Construction for the June loan, and one
payment earmarked for the August loan. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Bodell Construction
settled its claims against Jenson in exchange for a settlement payment.
IV.

SUMMARY OPINIONS AND GROUNDS THEREOF
A, Damages Related To Fraud
I am informed that the court will instruct the jury on the law governing the

calculation of damages. I am not an attorney, nor do I intend to offer opinions at trial
about the law applicable to the calculation of damages.
For purposes of my calculations, I have been instructed that when a plaintiff is
fraudulently induced to enter into a transaction, Utah courts award damages based on the
so-called "benefit of the bargain rule." I am instructed that under the benefit of the
bargain rule, a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the loss of his bargain and is not
limited to his out-of-pocket damages. I have also been instructed that, in at least one
case, a Utah appellate court affirmed an award of damages based on an alternative theory.
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Under this alternative theory, the plaintiff was awarded damages based on the rate of
return the plaintiff would have received if he had invested his money elsewhere. I will
henceforth refer to this theory as the comparable rate of return rule.
I have been further instructed that under either the benefit of the bargain rule or
the comparable rate of return rule, a plaintiff is also entitled to compensation for any
additional pecuniary loss that was a consequence of the fraud (i.e., consequential
damages).
1. Benefit Of The Bargain Rule
As a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations in the Letter, Bodell Construction
made a four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan to Jenson. Bodell Construction, in
return, was promised that it would receive interest on the loan at the rate of one percent
(1.0 %) per week, accruing on the outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the
beginning of each Wednesday, until it was repaid. The specific repayment terms of the
loan are set forth in a Promissory Note signed by Jenson on August 30, 2000. I
understand that courts that have applied the benefit of the bargain rule in similar
situations have awarded damages based on the contractual rate of interest.
Bodell Construction made the loan on August 30, 2000, Applying interest at the
contractual rate described in the Promissory Note, and accounting for the contractual loan
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson,
the outstanding amount of principal and interest due and owing on the loan as of October
22, 2007 (the first day of trial) is $18,449,872.41. The Promissory Note also provides
and Bodell bargained for "all reasonable costs of collection or other costs incurred in the
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protection of [Bodell Construction], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys
fees and costs incurred by [Bodell Construction] if [the] Promissory Note is referred to an
attorney for collection." Through April 30, 2007, Bodell has incurred $393,417.98 in
attorneys' fees and costs attempting to recover for breach of the Promissory Note. That is
part of the agreement Bodell Construction bargained for. Adding that sum to the total for
principle and interest, Bodell Construction is entitled to $18,843,290.39 (plus attorneys'
fees and costs through triall) if the jury concludes it should receive the benefit of the
bargain it made in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations made by Bank One in its
Letter. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to
reach this figure.
I am informed that consequential damages are also recoverable in fraud cases. I
am instructed that consequential damages include (but are not necessarily limited to) the
following: expenses resulting from the misrepresentations; loss of goodwill; any amounts
expended in mitigation of damages; lost earnings; pre-judgment interest; and interest on
loans required to finance plaintiffs business due to the unpaid loan. For purposes of my
analysis, I have conservatively identified as consequential damages only the amount of
interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was forced to borrow
against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in connection
with the August 2000 Jenson loan. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a spreadsheet detailing my
calculations of those actual consequential damages incurred by Bodell as a result of the
$4,000,000 loan it was induced to make. As shown in Exhibit 9, those damages total
$127,281.18.

-7-

Adding Bodell Construction's consequential damages to the other totals results in
total damages of $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule.
Acknowledging that Bodell Construction entered into the August 2000 Jenson
loan with an expectation that the loan was to be relatively short-term in nature, I have
been asked to perform a modified benefit of the bargain rule analysis as an aid to the jury.
For purposes of this analysis, I applied the terms and conditions of the August 2000 loan
agreement only through October 3, 2000, the date specified in the contract for payment of
all outstanding principal and interest (and fees, etc.). From that date forward, I
substituted the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of interest (one
percent per week). For purposes of this analysis, I also excluded the default and late fees
for which the contract provides. All other aspects of my previous calculation remained in
effect (attorneys' fees and costs per the contract, and interest payments as consequential
damages). Applying the statutory rate of return, instead of the contract rate, from the date
on which all the principal and interest was due and owing, results in total damages to
Bodell Construction of $5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule.
Attached as Exhibit 6 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to reach this
result.
2. Comparable Rate of Return
MJB Ltd., a Bodell Family Partnership and James H. Bodell, a Bodell
Construction Stockholder have made loans to other bridge loan companies over the years
that have had rates of return ranging between 18 and 36 percent, with 25 percent
representing a fair estimate of the average rate of return for this kind of transaction. This
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figure is confirmed by loan documents generated in connection with those loans. Bodell
Construction very likely could have achieved returns above 18 percent had it invested
elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead induced to loan to Jenson. Nonetheless,
for purposes of my comparable rate of return analysis here I have assumed a rate of 18
percent as a comparable rate of return available through other investments. Applying that
rate from the date of the Jenson loan, it is my opinion that Bodell Construction would
have earned $3,510,352.96, in addition to the payments applied to the note, had Bodell
Construction invested in its traditional method the four million dollars it was instead
fraudulently induced to loan to Jenson. Thus, Bodell Construction's damages under the
comparable rate of return rule is $7,510,352.96 including the $4,000,000.00 of the
original loan. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet detailing my calculations of those
damages.
Because this calculation is not directly based on the contractual terms of the
Jenson loan, I have not included in this analysis attorneys' fees, costs or consequential
damages, such as interest paid on lines of credit Bodell Construction was forced to tap
when Jenson failed to make payments on the August 2000 loan.
3. Total Fraud Damages
Based on the calculations described above, it is my opinion that the fraudulent
misrepresentations made in the August 22, 2000 letter caused Bodell Construction to
incur damages totaling $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule;
$5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule; or totaling $7,510,352.96
under the comparable rate of return rule. These amounts do not include any allocation for

-9-

punitive damages, which I am told are subject to a separate analysis for the jury to
conduct after instruction by the court.
B. Damages Related to Negligent Misrepresentations
I have been instructed that the proper measure of damages in an action for
negligent misrepresentation is that amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the
pecuniary loss to him for which the misrepresentation is the legal cause, and often is
measured as the difference between the value received in a transaction and any value
given for it, plus any additional pecuniary losses otherwise suffered as a consequence of
the misrepresentation (i.e., consequential damages). I am informed that under Utah law
the total measure of such damages includes statutory prejudgment interest at a rate of
10% per annum as the damages become liquidated.
1. Difference Between Value Received and Value Given
In this case, the difference between the value that Bodell Construction received in
connection with the August 2000 loan and the value given was $4,000,000, minus funds
received from Jenson and applied against the August 2000 loan. Exhibit 10 shows the
$4,000,000 loan accruing interest at the statutory rate (10%) from the date of the loan
through the first day of trial, making adjustments for payments received by Jenson
against the August 2000 loan. Statutory interest is applied here because the damages
were liquidated when Bodell Construction made the loan in August 2000. After
accounting for the Jenson payments, the difference between the value given and the value
received is $4,939,195.32.
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As I did previously in the benefit of the bargain analysis, I conservatively apply as
consequential damages here only interest payments Bodell Construction was forced to
make when it had to draw on its line of credit as a result of Jenson missing payments
under the August 2000 loan. As shown in Exhibit 9, those payments totaled $127,281.18.
2.

Total Negligent Misrepresentation Damages.

Adding consequential damages to the analysis above for the difference between
the value given and the received in connection with the August 2000 loan, Bodell
Construction's damages under a negligent misrepresentation analysis conservatively total
$5,066,476.50. This does not include application of prejudgment interest to the
consequential damages as they became liquidated.
V.

COMPENSATION AND PUBLICATIONS

Save for my regular salary, I am receiving no compensation for my work on this
report. There have been no publications authored by me within the preceding ten years.
As this case progresses, I reserve the right to supplement this report as needed or
as additional relevant information becomes available.

Sincerely,

lerrill Weight
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EXHIBIT 1
Bodell Constriction Company
v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REVIEWED BY MERRILL L. WEIGHT FOR
PREPARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS REPORT
MSF Properties, L.C. Certificate of Participation, dated June 23, 2000.
MSF Properties Private Placement Agreement, dated June 23, 2000.
Guaranty, dated June 23, 2000.
Promissory Note, Dated August 30, 2000.
Guaranty, dated August 30, 2000.
Payment documentation for payments on the Certificate of Completion and Promissory
Note.
Legal fees and cost billings for collection actions on the Certificate of Completion and
Promissory Note.
Bank and accounting information for interest paid on the Bodell line of credit.
Letter, dated August 22, 2000 from Benjamin Lightner.
Bridge Loan terms from Waterford Funding, LLC, and Cypress Capital.
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EXHIBIT 2

As Secretary and Treasurer of Bodell Construction Company, Mr.
Weight is responsible for all financial operations within the Company.
This includes the preparation of financial statements, management
reports, corporate and field office administration, tax management, and
resolution of perception differences.
Bodell Construction Company maintains it's financial stability and
viability, due to Mr. Weight's years of experience and accounting
responsibilities.
Summary of Experience

Merrill L Weight
Secretary / Treasurer
Construction
Expenence:
37 years
Experience with
Bodell Construction
Company:

Prior to joining Bodell Construction, Mr. Weight worked for the following
organizations:
Project Analysts, Executive Vice President
Mr. Weight was responsible for office administration, sales, preparation
of construction claims and expert witness testimony.

17 years
Credentials
BS Accounting
Brigharn Young University

Jelco, Inc., Secretary /Treasurer

Licensed Certified
Public Accountant

Responsible for accounting operations, including financial and job cost
management, income taxes, and corporate/field office administration.

Specialized project
costing and reporting

Cooper & Lybrand, Senior Staff Auditor

Income Tax Planning

Mr. Weight performed certified audits of client financial statements and
prepared income tax returns, with construction clients as a specialty.

Extensive knowledge
of the construction
industry
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EXHIBIT 3
6/11/07

Print Date
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C.
$4,000,000 NOTE
COMPARISON TOTALS
As At 10 22-07 (LEGAL FEES AND COSTS ONLY THROUGH 4-30-07)

!

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 5 *

'

|

~

'

Per Original
Note Terms

Exhibit 6" ~ I
Alternative
I
Ujiing Original |
Note Terms
Excluding
' Default Penalty 1
Through 10-3-00
'ubsequent at |
10% APR
I

Principal Balance

$4,280,000.00

$4,000,000.00

$3,694,000,12

Accrued Interest Balance

14,163,872.41

3,510,352.96

1,699,240.06

Subtotal For Principal And interest
Legal Fees And Costs 1hrough 4-30-07 (Exhibit 7)
Subtotal Including Principal, Interest, and Legal Fees And Costs
Consequential Damages - Interest on Bank Line of Credit Borrowing
Total Including Principal, interest. Legal Fees and Costs, and Consequential Damages

18,449,872.41

7,51

r

393,417,98
18,843,290.39

370,246,76
7,510,352.98

127,281.18
$18,970,571.57

5,393,240.18

5,763,486.94
127,281.18

$7,510,352.96

$5,890,768.12

BODELL, CON'S TRUCT ION

EXHIBIT 4
6 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 7 15:44

PRINT DATE
HSF P R O P E R T I E S , L . C .
54,000,000.00

NOTE

AMORTIZATION SCHETUI-2
INTEREST RATE

DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL LOAN
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC
LOAN F E E
LATE CHARGE O N DEFAULT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT (NOTE 1)
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

1,00% FE= ^ 2 ™ H-

DATE
8/30/2000
10/3/2000
10/3/2000
10/3/2Q0Q
5/1/2001
5/2/2001
3/18/2003
3/18/2003

NUMBER

PRINCIPAL

1

TOTAL

INTEREST

OF WEEKS

INCREASE
$4,000,000.00
200,000.00
80,000.00
42,800.00

1

PAYMENT

ACCRUED

$250,000.00
1,386,167.59

10/23/2007

TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/23/2007
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST
LEGAL FEES, COLLECTION COSTS THROUGH
COMBINED

4/30/07

INTEREST ACCRUAL PER WEEK. SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 / 2 3 / 2 0 07
PRINCIPAL BALANCE
TIMES WEEKLY RATE
WEEKLY INTEREST CHARGES I N ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY
(NOTE 1}

_VA2._E EAC_

$200,000.00
0.00
Q.OO
1,296,840.00
O.QO
1.94,400.00
0.00
:.-2, ooo. oo

$4,280,000.00
14/169,872.41
18,449,872.41
393,417.98
$18,843,290.39

$4,280,000.00
1.00%
$42,800.00

PAYMENT APPLIED FIRST TO LATE FEE AS REDUCTION OF PRXNCIPAL, AND REMAINDER TO INTEREST

j

INTEREST

J PAID OR ADJ
$200,000.00
0.00
0.00
0 . 00
207,200.00
0.0 0
1,386,167.59
0.00

INTEREST

j

BALANCE

1

$0.00
O.QO
0.00
0 .00
1,296,840.00
1,089,640.00
5,284,040.00
3,837,872.41
14,169,872.41

VKLSZZ--Z.
FAi:
30
,00
.00
.00
00
.oc
.00
.00

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00
4,200,000.00
4,280,000.00
4,322.800.00
4,322,800.00
4,280,000.00
4,280,000.00
4,280,000.00
4,280,000-00

EXHIBIT 5
BODELL

CONSTRUCTION

PRIHT DATE
COMPARABLS RATS

MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L - C .
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE
I N T E R E S T RATS

NUMBER
OF DAYS

(DESCRIPTION
O R I G I N A L LOAN
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

8/30/2000

PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

5/2/2001
5/2/2001
3/18/2003

PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

3/18/2003
.0/22/2007

INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO
P R I N C I P A L BALANCE
TIKES DAILY RATE
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE
$4,000,000-00

245
0
685
0
1,679

TOTAJQ BALANCE DUB THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07
PRIKCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND INTEREST

_o

6/11/2007 15i46

TOTAL
PAYMENT

$250,000.00
1,386,167.59

$4,000,000.00
3,510,352.9 6
7,510,352-96
10/22/2007
$4,000,000.00
0-0493%
$1,972.00

INTEREST
ACCRUED

INTEREST
PAID OR ADJ

483,287.67
0.00
1,351,232.88
0.00

0.00
250,000-00
0.00
1,386,167.59

3,312,000.00

0.00

INTEREST
BALANCE
$0.00
483,287.67
233,257.67
1,584,520.55
198,352.96
3,510,352-96

PRINCIPAL
PAID

o.oo
0.00
0 .00
0.00
0.00

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00

BODELL

CONSTRUCTION

EX3IEIT

PRINT DATE
MSF P R O P E R T I E S ,
34,000, 000.00
AMORTIZATION
INTEREST

L.C.

ALTERNATIVE P R E - .JUDGMENT RATE AFTER ORIGINAL DUE DATE

NOTE
SCHEDULE

RATE

1.00% PER WEEK IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY THROUGH 1 0 - 3 - 0 0
1 0 . 0 0 % APR SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 - 3 - 0 0

CALCULATED ON DAYS OUTSTANDING

3 6 5 DAY YEAR
NUMBER OP

[DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL LOAN
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC
LOAN FEE
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT {1
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

DATE

8/30/2000
10/3/2000
10/3/2000
10/3/2000
S/2/2001
5/2/20 01
3/18/2 003
3/18/2003
10/22/2007

WEEKLY OR

WEEKS/DAYS

5 WEEKLY
0

WEEKLY

0

WEEKLY

211

DAILY

0

DAILY

635

DAILY

0

DAILY

679

DAILY

TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/22/2007
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL PRIMCIPAL AND INTER3ST
LEGAL FEES, COLLECTION COSTS 8/1/03 T
COMBINED
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO
PRINCIPAL BALANCE
TIMES DAILY RATE
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES

NOTE (1)

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE
34,000,000.00
200,000.00
80,000.00
a.oo

LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT NOT ASSESSED IN TEIS CALCULATION

INTEREST
ACCRUED

'BREST
| PAID OR ADJ

INTEREST
BALANCE

PRINCIPAL

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,. 000.
,000.00

$0 .00

|20u,,000.,00

$200,,000..00

0 .00

$0..00

4,,200,,000.00

0 .00

0 .00
0 .00

0 .00

0 .00

0 . 00

0 .00

4,,280,,000.00
4,,280,,000.00

0 . 00
247,,413..18

0 .00

247 ,419..18

0,.00

4,,280,.000.00

0..00

2 4 7 ,,419..18

0 .00

;sc..82

4,,277,,419.18

802,,748..53

0 .00

802., 7 4 8 ..53

0..CO

4,,277,,419.18

0 .00

802.,748..53

0..00

19.,06

3,.694,,000.12

,240. 06

0 .00

639,r 2 4 0 ..06

0..00

3.,694,,000.12

$250,000,00
1,386,167.59
,63$,

S3,694,000.12
1,699,240.06
5,393,240.18
370,246.76
$5,763,486.94
10/22/2 007

TOTAL
PAYMENT

6

6/11/2007 15:47
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EXHIBIT 7
6/11/07

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
MSF PROPERTIES / MARC JENSON NOTES RECEIVABLE
LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION ACTIONS THROUGH 4-30-07
AND APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT

INVOICE DATE

LAW FIRM
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE $ MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &
BURBIDGE MnXHELL &
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &

INVOICE AMOUNT

4/30/01
5/31/01
11/30/01
1/16/02
2/28/02
6/30/02
1/31/03
2/28/03
3/31/03

$415.00
230.00
125.00
717.50
115.00
262.50
5,104.50
9,695.12

4/30/03
5/31/03
7/31/03

368.75
2,360.00
2,249.50

0/31/03
9/30/03
10/31/03
11/30/03
12/31/03
1/31/04
3/31/04
4/30/04
5/31/04

103.75
1,496.25
1.807.50
4.939.46
8.605.40
3,680.79
5.704.84
3,068.50
6,711.07
1,088.15

6/30/04

3,965.75

7/31/04
8/31/04

1.285.00
2,264.75
11,521,00
8,381.75
752.00

SUBTOTAL

ALLOCATEO TO
ALLOCATED TO
6-23-00 NOTE 20%
8-30-00 NOTE

6,054.09

2/29/04

9/30/04
10/31/04
11/30/04
12731/04
1/31/05
2/28/05
3/31/05
4/30/05
5/31/05
6/30/05

£4,543.74

4,970.25

935.75
494.00
7,800.71

30,625.42
39,381.35

7,673.23
8,255.65
6,232.77
627.43

8/31/05
9/30/05
10/31/05
11/30/05
12/31/05
1/31/06
2/28/06

120.00
455.25
3,192.25
6,371.05
2,337.25
17,730.10
41,564.35
31,616.92

3/31/06
4/30/06
5/31/06

6/30/06

2,635.85

7/31/06
8/31/06
9/30/06
10/31/06
11/30/06
12731/06
1/31/07
3/13/07
3/31/07
4/30/07

14,395.15
20,654.10
2.591.75

2,629.75
3.443.89
10,394.72
9,729.32
6,452.38
24,141.91

TOTAL LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION THROUGH 4/30/07
ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE FOR FEES THROUGH 3^31-03
NOTE DATED 6/23/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT
NOTE DATED 8/30/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT

$393,417.98
I

PRIG. PRINC"
$1,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
35,000,000.00

APPLICATION OF 3/10/03 PAYMENT
6/23/2000 NOTE PRINCIPAL (TO EXHIBIT 8)
6/23/2000 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 8)
6/23/2000 NOTE LEGAL FEES AND COLLECTION COSTS (ABOVE)
8/30/00 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 4)
TOTAL. 3/18/03 PAYMENT

816,174.97

1,497.75
708.75

7/31/05

GROSS
GROSS
GROSS
GROSS

P.07

$1,128,541.94
480,746.73
4,543.74
1,386,167.59
$3,000,000.00

20.00%
80.00%

BODELL. C O N S T R U C T I O N

PRINT DATE
M S F P R O P E R T I E S , L.C.
$1,000,000.00
AMORTIZATION
INTEREST

ORIGINAL PER NOTE

TERMS

NOTE
SCHEDULE

RATE

2 5 . 0 0 % APR
3 65

DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL

EXHIBIT 8
6/11/2007 15:51

DATE
5/23/2000

LOAN

DAY YEAR
NUMBER

PRINCIPAL

TOTAL

INTEREST

INTEREST

INTEREST

PRINCIPAL

OF DAYS

INCREASE

PAYMENT

ACCRUED

PAID OR ATkJ

BALANCE

PAID

$1,000 000 00

INTERJSST A D D E D TO

PRXNC

9/21/2000

90

61 643 84

I N T E R E S T A D D E D TO

PRINC

2/22/2000

92

66

BALANCE

$0 00

898 10

PRINCIPAL

$1,000,000.00

$61 643 84
66 898 10

561 643 .84
66, 898 .10

0 .00
0 00

$0 00
0 00

1,061,643.84
1,128,541.94

PAYMENT

2/5/2003

775
6

599 054 80
4 637 84

25, 000 .00

4 9 9 , 0 5 4 . 80
4 7 8 , 6 9 2 . 64

0 00
0 00

1,128,541.94

2/11/2003

$100 000 00
25 000 00

1 0 0 , 000 00

PAYMENT
PAYMENT

2/14/2003

3

25 000 00

2 318 92

25, 000 00

4 5 6 , 0 1 1 . 56

0 00

1,128,541.94

PAYMENT

3/18/2003

32

24 735 17

4 8 0 , 746 73

0 00

1,128, 5 4 1 . 94

0 .00

1,609

288 67

1,128,541.94

BODELL CONSTRUCTION
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EXHIBIT 9

I IY

CALCULATION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
TRANS TYPE
TO
FROM
04/01/02 I 04/30/02 TADV/PAY/INT I
05/01/02 05/31/02 I ADV/PAY/INT
06/01/02 06/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
07/01/02 07/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
08/01/02 08/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
09/01/02 09/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
, 10/01/02 10/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
11/01/02 11/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
12/01/02 12/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
01/01/03 01/31/03 ADV/PAY/INT
03/03/05 03/04/05 ADVANCE
03/03/05 03/04/05 INTEREST
03/04/05 03/07/05 PAYMENT
03/07/05 03/08/05 ADVANCE
ADVANCE
03/08/05
03/08/05 03/09/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/09/05
03/09/05 03/10/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
03/01/05
03/10/05 03/11/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
03/11/05
ADVANCE
03/14/05
03/14/05 03/15/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/15/05
03/15/05 03/16/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
03/16/05
ADVANCE
03/17/05
03/17/05 03/18/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/18/05
03/18/05 03/21/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/21/05
03/21/05 i 03/22/05 INTEREST
jADVANCE
03/22/05
03/22/05 03/23/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
03/23/05
| ADVANCE
03/25/05
PAYMENT
03/28/05
ADVANCE
03/29/05
ADVANCE
03/30/05
ADVANCE
03/31/05
ADJ INTEREST
04/01/05
ADVANCE
04/01/05
04/01/05 04/04/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
04/04/05
04/04/05 04/05/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
04/05/05
ADVANCE
12/27/05
12/27/05 12/28/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/28/05
12/28/05 12/29/05_ INTEREST
12/29/05
ADVANCE
12/29/05

I 01/09/06 |

12/30/05 (INTEREST
[PAYMENT

J

ADVANCE
PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE
PAYMENT
RATE
4,938,899.46 I 3,549,064.15 I 1,389,835.31 I
7,010.97 I
5,050,101.70 4,509,327.33 1,930,609.68
706.06
426,485.23
2,099,312.36 3,603,436.81
5,257.55
426,485.23
123.59
426,485.23
92.17
426,485.23
72.72
426,485.23
426,485.23
426,485.23
1,202,794.26
1,629,279.49
400,987.22
400,987.22
400,987.22
61.26 5.50%
356,919.42
44,067.80
163.59 5.50%
618,953.22
975,872.64
149.09 5.50%
101,509.74
1,077,382.38
1,077,382.38
164.60 5.50%
569,969.84
1,647,352.22 |
1,647,352.22
251.68 5.50%
903,242.38
744,109.84
903,242.38
138.00 5.50%
903,242.38
327,409.77
327,409.77
327,409.77
50.02 5.50%
160,248.95
487,658.72
487,658.72
74.50 5.50%
487,658.72
396,272.47 I
396,272.47
396,272.47
60.54 5.50%
162,545.95
558,818.42
558,818.42
256.13 5.50%
291,637.34
850,455.76
850,455.76
129.93 5.50%
118,899.81
969,355.57
969,355.57
154.83 j 5.75%
969,355.57
213,993.63
213,993.63
103,358.23
110,635.40
330,434.38
433,792.61
102,687.16
!
536,479.77
213,594.17
750,073.94
750,073.94
393.82 5.75%
153,046.42
903,120.36
903,120.36
432.75 5.75%
825,115.15
78,005.21
825,115.15
131.79 5.75%
825,115.15
446,268.24
446,268.24
446,268.24
89.87 7.25%
838,179,58
1,284,447.82
1,284,447.82
258.67 7.25%
188,457.32
1,472,905.14
1,472,905.14
296.63 7.25%
1^72^905.14

J
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P.10

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE

PAYMENT

PRINCBAL INT ACCRUE

2,117,321.53 I
ADVANCE
l 2,117,321.53 I
374,057.19
1,743,264.34
PAYMENT
1,743,264.34
06/30/06 INTEREST
1,743,264.34
ADJ INTEREST
1,743,264.34
07/03/06 INTEREST
124,804.04
1,868,068.38
ADVANCE
1,868,068.38
07/05/06 INTEREST
61,471.82
ADVANCE
1,929,540.20
1,929,540.20
07/06/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
592,799.13 1,336,741.07
1,336,741.07
07/07/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
1,336,741.07
743,621.24
ADVANCE
743,621.24
07/17/06 INTEREST
743,621.24
ADVANCE
830,254.93
1,573,876.17
1,573,876.17
07/18/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
243,271.19 j
1,817,147.36
I
1,817,147.36
07/19/06 : INTEREST
ADVANCE
|
913,087.95 i
2,730,235.31
2,730,235.31
07/20/06 INTEREST
606,082.19
ADVANCE
3,336,317.50
3,336,317.50
07/21/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
287,413.20
3,623,730.70
3,623,730.70
07/24/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
3,889,309.45
265,578.75
918,550.48 2,970,758.97
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
564,088.83
3,534,847.80
ADVANCE
205,555.25
3,740,403.05
34,026.19 3,706,376.86
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
127,329.81
3,833,706.67
ADJINTEREST
3,833,706.67
ADVANCE
231,143.07
4,064,849.74
08/02/06 INTEREST
4,064,849.74
ADVANCE
135,706.00
4,200,555.74
08/03/06 INTEREST
4,200,555.74
PAYMENT
I 1,669,388.76 2,531,166.98
08/04/06 INTEREST
2,531,166.98
PAYMENT
I
5,193.15 2,525,973.83
08/07/06 INTEREST
2,525,973.83
ADVANCE
461,353.99
2,987,327.82
08/08/06 INTEREST
2,987,327.82
ADVANCE
213,764.20
3,201,092.02
08/09/06 INTEREST
3,201,092.02
ADVANCE
263,816.02
3,464,908.04
08/10/06 INTEREST
3,464,908.04
ADVANCE
200,391.05
3,665,299.09
08/11/06 INTEREST
3,665,299.09
PAYMENT
269,770.50 3,395,528.59
08/14/06 INTEREST
3,395,528.59
ADVANCE
583,959.63
3,979,488.22
08/15/06 INTEREST
3,979,488.22
PAYMENT
327,177.55 3,652,310.67
08/16/06 INTEREST
3,652,310.67
ADVANCE
297,305.87
3,949,616.54
3,949,616.54 I
08/16/06 08/17/06 INTEREST
I
167,536.43
l_4,117,152.97j
(ADVANCE
I 08/17/06

06/30/06 I
06/30/06
06/01/06
07/01/06
07/01/06
| 07/03/06
07/03/06
07/05/06
j 07/05/06
07/06/06
! 07/06/06
07/07/06
07/14/06
07/14/06
07/17/06
07/17/06 |
07/18/06
07/18/06
07/19/06
07/19/06
07/20/06
07/20/06
07/21/06
07/21/06
07/24/06
07/25/06
07/26/06
07/27/06
07/28/06
07/31/06
08/01/06
08/01/06
08/01/06
08/02/06
08/02/06
08/03/06
08/03/06
08/04/06
08/04/06
08/07/06
08/07/06
08/08/06
08/08/06
08/09/06
08/09/06
08/10/06
08/10/06
08/11/06
08/11/06
08/14/06
08/14/06
08/15/06
08/15/06
08/16/06
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RATE

10,866.46
204.08
799.00

8.00%
8.00%
8.25%

856.20

8.25%

442.18

8.25%

306.34

8.25%

511.24

8.25%

360.68

8.25%

416.43

8.25%

625.68

8.25%

764.57

8.25%

2,491.32

8.25%

(464.37) 8.25%
931.53

8.25%

962.63

8.25%

580.06

8.25%

1,736.60

8.25%

684.60

8.25%

733.58

8.25%

794.04

8.25%

839.97

8.25%

2,334.42

8.25%

911.97

8.25%

836.99

8.25%

905.12

8.25%

INT. PAID

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax:8012611020

Jun 11 2007 15:57

P. 11

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM
TO
08/17/06 08/18/06
08/18/06
08/18/06 08/21/06
08/21/06
08/21/06 08/22706
| 08/22/06
08/22/06 08/23/06
08/23/06
! 08/23/06 08/24/06
08/24/06
08/24/06 09/01/06
! 08/25/06
j 08/28/06
08/29/06 i
08/30/06 I
! 08/31/06
09/01/06 !
09/01/06
09/01/06 09/05/06
09/05/06
09/05/06 09/06/06
09/06/06
09/06/06 09/07/06
09/07/06
09/07/06 09/08/06
09/08/06
09/08/06 09/11/06
09/11/06
09/11/06 09/12/06
09/12/06
09/12/06 09/13/06
09/13/06
09/13/06 09/14/06
09/14/06
09/14/06 09/15/06
09/15/06
09/15/06 09/18/06
09/18/06
09/18/06 09/19/06
09/19/06
09/19/06 09/20/06
09/20/06
09/20/06 09/21/06
09/21/06
09/21/06 | 10/01/06
09/22/06
09/25/06
09/26/06
09/27/06
09/28/06
09/29/06
10/01/06
10/01/06 10/02/06
10/02/06
10/02/06 10/03/06

TRANS TYPE
ADVANCE
INTEREST
l
PAYMENT
INTEREST
1,733,413.22
ADVANCE
INTEREST
PAYMENT
INTEREST
90,302.15
ADVANCE
INTEREST
357,061.11
ADVANCE
INTEREST
PAYMENT
PAYMENT
772,719.81
ADVANCE
I
88,900.74
ADVANCE
2,643,784.87
ADVANCE
ADJ INTEREST !
PAYMENT
INTEREST
849,202.64
ADVANCE
INTEREST
PAYMENT
INTEREST
ADVANCE
464,810.82
INTEREST
609,482.45
ADVANCE
INTEREST
PAYMENT
INTEREST
114,908.22
ADVANCE
INTEREST
ADVANCE
1,223,622.59
INTEREST
195,899.17
ADVANCE
INTEREST
125.82
ADVANCE
INTEREST
580,330.89
ADVANCE
INTEREST
PAYMENT
INTEREST
ADVANCE
344,621.89
INTEREST
1,405,700.54
ADVANCE
INTEREST
141,514.07
ADVANCE
ADVANCE
292,225.58
444,077.56
ADVANCE
308,980.84
ADVANCE
242,503.49
ADVANCE
ADVANCE
83,500.33
ADJINTEREST
INTEREST
116,859.20
ADVANCE

I 10/03/06

| ADVANCE

I

PAYMENT

PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE
RATE
4,117,152.97 I
943^1"T 8.25% j
2,686,445.71 1,430,707.26
1,430,707.26
983.61 8.25%
3,164,120.48
3,164,120.48
725.12 8.25%
725,654.30 2,438,466.18
2,438,466.18
558.81 8.25%
2,528,768.33
2,528,768.33
579.51 8.25%
2,885,829.44
2,885,829.44
5,290.69 8.25%
170,100.73 2,715,728.71 I
1,664,334.95 1,051,393.76 i
1,824,113.57
1,913,014.31
4,556,799.18
4,556,799.18
(620.65)! 8.25%
324,195.96 I 4,232,603.22
4,232,603.22
3,879.88 8.25%
5,081,805.86
5,081,805.86
1,164.58 8.25%
2,270,701.62 2,811,104.24
2,811,104.24
644.21 8.25%
3,275,915.06
3,275,915.06
750.73 8.25%
3,885,397.51
3,885,397.51
2,671.21 8.25%
1,745,091.11 2,140,306.40
2,140,306.40
490.49 8.25%
2,255,214.62
2,255,214.62
516,82 8.25%
3,478,837.21
3,478,837.21
797.24 I 8.25%
3,674,736.38
3,674,736.38 j
842.12 8.25%
3,674,862.20
3,674,862.20
2,526.47 8.25%
4,255,193.09
4,255,193.09
975.15 8.25%
1,801,057.86 2,454,135.23
2,454,135.23
562.40 8.25%
2,798,757.12
2,798,757.12
641.39 8.25%
, 4,204,457.66
; 4,204,457.66
9,635.21 8.25%
4,345,971.73
4,638,197.31
5,082,274.87
5,391,255.71
5,633,759.20
5,717,259.53
5,717,259.53
1,690.75 8.25% !
5,717,259.53
1,310.20 8.25%
5,834,118.73
5,834,118.73
1,336.99 8.25%
125,727.63
| 5,959,846.36
Page 3 of 5
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P. 12

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE

I
10/03/06 I 10/04/06 I INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/04/06
10/04/06 10/05/06 INTEREST
388,195.68
ADVANCE
10/05/06
I 10/05/06 10/06/06 INTEREST
101,290.36
ADVANCE
10/06/06
10/06/06 10/10/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/10/06
10/10/06 10/11/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/11/06
10/11/06 10/12/06 INTEREST
1,723,509.83
ADVANCE
10/12/06
!
10/12/06 10/13/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/13/06
10/13/06 10/16/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/16/06
10/16/06 10/17/06 INTEREST
250,458.34
ADVANCE
10/17/06
10/17/06 10/18/06 INTEREST
271,227.40
ADVANCE
10/18/06
10/18/06 10/19/06 INTEREST
161,473,52
ADVANCE
10/19/06
10/19/06 10/20/06 INTEREST
159,832.07
10/20/06
ADVANCE
10/20/06 10/23/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/23/06
10/23/06 10/24/06 INTEREST
161,893.54
10/24/06
ADVANCE
10/24/06 11/01/06 INTEREST
10/25/06
113,759.22
ADVANCE
10/26/06
ADVANCE
1,473,610.85
PAYMENT
10/27/06
PAYMENT
10/30/06
!
10/31/06
ADVANCE
146,376.74
11/01/06
I A D J INTEREST
I PAYMENT
|
11/01/06
11/01/06 I 11/02/06 [INTEREST
PAYMENT
11/02/06
ADVANCE
595,905.01
11/03/06
11/03/06 11/06/06 i INTEREST
11/06/06
(ADVANCE
150,925.18
11/06/06 11/07/06 INTEREST
11/07/06
ADVANCE
527,937.71
11/07/06 11/08/06 INTEREST
457,252.40
11/08/06
ADVANCE
11/08/06 11/09/06 INTEREST
11/09/06
PAYMENT
11/09/06 11/10/06 INTEREST
11/10/06
PAYMENT
11/10/06 11/13/06 INTEREST
11/13/06
ADVANCE
100,718.99
11/13/06 11/14/06 INTEREST
11/14/06
ADVANCE
135,450.13
11/14/06 11/15/06 INTEREST
81,239.68
(ADVANCE
11/15/06
| 11/15/06 I 11/16/06 |INTEREST

PAYMENT

PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE

5,959,846.36 I
256,802.50
5,703,043.86
5,703,043.86
6,091,239.54
6,091,239.54
6,192,529.90
6,192,529.90
2,176,856.13 4,015,673.77
4,015,673.77
702,180.72 3,313,493.05
3,313,493.05
5,037,002.88 !
5,037,002.88
2,643,061.14 2,393,941.74
2,393,941.74
45,916.79 2,348,024.95
2,348,024.95
2,598,483.29
2,598,483.29
2,869,710.69
2,869,710.69
3,031,184.21
3,031,184.21
3,191,016.28
3,191,016.28
2,098,713.24 1,092,303.04
1,092,303.04.
1,254,196.58.
1,254,196.58
1,367,955.80
2,841,566.65
84,258.31
2,757,308.34
1,992,182.23 |
765,126.11
911,502.85
911,502.85
68,451.57
843,051,28
843,051.28 |
843,051.28 |
595,905.01
595,905.01
746,830.19
746,830.19
1,274,767.90
1,274,767.90
1,732,020.30
1,732,020.30
208,478.89
1,523,541.41
1,523,541.41
369,042.87
1,154,498.54
1,154,498.54
1,255,217.53
1,255,217.53
1,390,667.66
I 1,390,667.66
| 1,471,907.34
I 1,471,907.34 j
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RATE

1,365.80 I 8.25% I
1,306.94

8.25%

1,395.91

8.25%

5,676.49

8.25%

920.26

8.25%

759,34

8.25%

1,154.31

8.25%

1,645.84

8.25%

538.09

8.25%

595.48

8.25%

657.65

8.25%

694.64

8.25%

2,193.83

8.25%

250,31 ; 8.25%
2,299.37

8.25%

1,232.61

8.25%

193.20

8.25%

409.69

8.25%

171.15

8.25%

292.13

8.25%

396.92

8.25%

349.15

8.25%

793.71

8.25%

287.66

8.25%

318.69

8.25%

337.32 j J^25% ;

INT. PAID
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P. 13

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE
I
, 11/16/06 I
! 11/16/06 11/17/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/17/06
j 11/17/06 11/20/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/20/06
11/20/06 11/21/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/21/06
I 11/21/06 11/22/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/22/06
11/22/06 12/01/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/24/06
ADVANCE
11/27/06
PAYMENT
11/28/06
PAYMENT
11/29/06
ADVANCE
11/30/06
ADJ INTEREST I
12/01/06
ADVANCE
12/01/06 |
12/01/06 12/04/06 ! INTEREST
12/04/06
PAYMENT
12/04/06 12/05/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/05/06
12/05/06 12/06/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/06/06
12/06/06 12/07/06 INTEREST
12/07/06
PAYMENT
12/07/06 12/08/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/08/06
12/08/06 12/11/06 INTEREST
12/11/06
ADVANCE
12/11/06 12/12/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/12/06
12/12/06 12/13/06 INTEREST
12/13/06
ADVANCE
12/13/06 I 12/14/06 INTEREST
12/14/06
ADVANCE
12/14/06 12/15/06 INTEREST
12/15/06
ADVANCE
12/15/06 12/18/06 INTEREST
12/18/06
ADVANCE
12/18/06 12/19/06 INTEREST
12/19/06
ADVANCE
12/19/06 12/20/06 INTEREST
12/20/06
ADVANCE
12/20/06 12/21/06 INTEREST
12/21/06
PAYMENT
12/21/06 01/01/07 INTEREST
12/22/06
PAYMENT
12/26/06
ADVANCE
12/27/06
PAYMENT
[ADJ INTEREST
I 12/31/06

ADVANCE

PAYMENT

94,991.14 I
183,083.86
63,424.87
439,471.46
236,022.92
370,978.15
319,886.92
2,123,011.70
1,006,657.45
355,327.80
152,675.59
181,582.25
837,462.59
265,306.82
46,077.44
154,210.03
175,280.45
115,156.13
129,303.64
48,831.27
233,168.66
651,234.11
158,857.04
89,071.54
2,353,246.50
525,705.21
57,310.98
366,682.76

PRINCBAL

INT ACCRUE

1,566,898.48 I
1,566,898.48
1,749,982.34
1,749,982.34
1,813,407.21
1,813,407.21
2,252,878.67
2,252,878.67
2,488,901.59
2,488,901.59
2,859,879.74
3,179,766.66
1,056,754.96
50,097.51
405,425.31
405,425.31
558,100.90
558,100.90
376,518.65
376,518.65
1,213,981.24
1,213,981.24
1,479,288.06
1,479,288.06
1,433,210.62
1,433,210.62
1,587,420.65
1,587,420.65
•1,762,701.10
1,762,701.10
1,877,857.23
i 1,877,857.23
[ 2,007,160.87
2,007,160.87
2,055,992.14
2,055,992.14
2,289,160.80
2,289,160.80
2,940,394.91
2,940,394.91
3,099,251.95
3,099,251.95
3,188,323.49
3,188,323.49
835,076.99
835,076.99
309,371.78
366,682.76
(0.00)
J
(0.00)|

TOTAL INTEREST COSTS

359.08

8.25%

1,203.11

8.25%

415.57

8.25%

516.29

8.25%

5,133.36

8.25%

INT. PAID

(951.19)! 8.25%
383.69

8.25%

86.29

8.25%

278.20

8.25%

339.01

8.25%

328.44

8.25%

1,091.35

8.25%

403.96

8.25%

430.34

8.25%

459.97

8.25%

471.17

8.25%

1,573.80

8.25%

673.84

8.25%

710.24

8.25%

730.66

8.25%

2,105.09

(1,546.10) I

$127,281.18
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RATE

8.25% '

8.25%
$127,281.18

BODSLL.

CONSTRUCTION
PRINT DATE

MSP P R O P E R T I E S , L . C .
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE
INTEREST RATE

DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL LOAN
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

EXHIBIT 10
6/11/2007 16s10

STATUTORY PREJUDGEMENT RATE

1 0 . 0 0 % APR
3 6 5 DAY YEAR
NUMBER
OF DAYS
8/30/2000
245
0

3/18/2003
3/18/2003

685
0
1,679

TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND INTEREST
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO
PRINCIPAL BALANCE
TIMES DAILY RATE
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES

TOTAL
PAYMENT

INTEREST
ACCRUED

INTEREST
PAID OR ADU

INTEREST
BALANCE
$0.00

0.00

268,493.15
18,493.15
769,178.08
0.00
1,556,184.83

$4,000,000.00

5/2/2001
5/2/2001

10/22/2007

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE

$3,383,010.49
1,556,184.83
4,939,195.32
10/22/2007
$3,383,010.49
0.0274%
$926.94

$250,000.00

268,493.15
0.00

1,386,167.59

750,684.93
0-00

250,000.00
0.00
769,178.08

1,556,184.83

0.00

PRINCIPAL
PAID

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00

0.00

4,000,000.00

0,00
0.00
616 989.51
0.00

4,000,000.00
3,383,010.49
3,383,010.49

4,000,000.00

Tab 4

Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
Rebecca C. Hyde (#6409)
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE
341 S. Main Street, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Tel. (801)531-7444
Fax (801)531-8885
Attorneys for Defendant

^o'STHicr

COURT

WAV 2 9 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT IN
ADVANCE OF NO CONTEST PLEA,
NO CONTEST PLEA, AND
PLEA IN ABEYANCE

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

MARC S. JENSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 051905391
Judge Robin Reese

The Defendant, Marc S. Jenson, by and through his attorney, Gregory G. Skordas, and
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Title 77, Chapter 13, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of no contest to the following crimes:

CRIME AND
STATUTORY PROVISION
Sale of an unregistered
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7
and 61-1-21) (Bodell)

DEGREE
Third Degree Felony

PUNISHMENT
(min/max) and/or
Minimum Mandatory
0-5 years Utah State Prison;
$5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge

Sale of an unregistered
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7
and 61-1-21) (Ebeling)

Third Degree Felony

0-5 years Utah State Prison;
$5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge

Sale of an unregistered
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7

Third Degree Felony

0-5 years Utah State Prison;
$5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge

and 61-1-21) (Ebeling)
I understand the nature and elements of the offenses for which I am pleading no contest,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the following
facts:
1.

Defendant Marc S. Jenson, age 48, is a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah. During the

relevant time period, Mr. Jenson was the registered agent and sole manager of MSF Properties, L.C.
("MSF Properties") and Wilshire Investments, LLC ("Wilshire Investments"). Mr. Jenson5 s primary
business was in a type of commercial lending sometimes known as "hard-money lending", which
involves making short-term, high-interest loans to real estate developers and entrepreneurs seeking to
take advantage of time-critical opportunities or working to secure long-term financing.
2.

In August 2005, Mr. Jenson was charged by the State of Utah in an Information (the

"Original Information") with five counts of securities fraud and one count of racketeering:
•

Count 1 involved an investment in June 2000 by Michael Bodell ("Bodell")
and his company Bodell Construction with MSF Properties.

•

Count 2 involved a loan in August 2000 by Bodell and Bodell Construction
to MSF Properties.
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•

Count 3 and Count 4 related to funds in the amount of $2,500,000, delivered
to MSF Properties by Morris K. Ebeling ("Ebeling") in September 2000.

•

Count 5 involved investments during the summer of 2001 by Ricke White
("White") and his company RA Enterprises, LLC, with MSF Properties
and/or Wilshire Investments.

•

Count 6 alleged a violation of Utah's racketeering statute, Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-1601*/^.

3.

Also in August 2005, the Utah Division of S ecurities issued an Order to Show Cause

(the "Division Action") against Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties relating to the same transactions
referenced in the Original Information and alleging (a) securities fraud, (b) sale by an unlicensed
broker-dealer or agent, and (c) sale of unregistered securities.
4.

Mr. Jenson entered a plea of not guilty to all of the Counts set forth in the Original

Information. Pending resolution of this case, Mr. Jenson has not responded to the Division Action.
Bodell Counts
5.

Following a hearing on the matter in August 2007, Count 1 was not bound over as it

fell outside the statute of limitations. Mr. Jenson was bound over on Count 2, Count 3, Count 4,
Count 5 and Count 6 of the Original Information.
6.

In the transaction forming the basis for Count 2 of the Original Information, Bodell

loaned $4,000,000 to MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson personally guaranteed the loan. MSF
Properties and Mr. Jenson were unable to repay the loan on time and Bodell later threatened civil
litigation against Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties.
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7.

On March 18,2003, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement

agreement pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties made a $3 million payment to Bodell
and Bodell signed an accord and satisfaction in which he waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson
and MSF Properties relating to the transactions among them.
8.

In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into an agreement (the

"Bodell Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to
provide additional consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confiimed will be satisfactory to him as
foil restitution from Mr. Jenson in connection with the loans made by Bodell to MSF Properties and
Mr. Jenson. Bodell has also confirmed that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided for
herein.
Ebeling Counts
9.

In August and September 2000, MSF Properties used the $4,000,000 it received from

Bodell, together with $4,000,000 in additional funds, which included the $2,500,000fromEbeling,
to make an $8,000,000 loan to Mark Robbins ("Robbins").
10.

Ebeling did not receive any of his funds backfromJenson. In 2003, Ebeling sued Mr.

Jenson, MSF Properties, Robbins and others in connection with his funds, pursuant to a case in Third
District Court, State of Utah, captioned Ebeling v. Jenson et ah. Civil No. 030915550 (the "Ebeling
Litigation"). Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have counterclaimed against Ebeling in the Ebeling
Litigation and have also sued Robbins separately to collect on the loan (and other subsequent loans)
made by MSF Properties to Robbins.
11.

In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Ebeling entered into an agreement (the

"Ebeling Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to
4

provide consideration to Ebeling which Ebeling has confirmed will (a) be satisfactory to him as full
restitutionfromMr. Jenson in connection with the funds provided by Ebeling to MSF Properties and
Mr. Jenson and (b) definitively resolve all outstanding matters in the Ebeling Litigation as between
Ebeling, on the one hand, and MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson, on the other hand. Ebeling has also
confirmed that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided for herein.
White Count
12.

In the transaction forming the basis for Count 5 of the Original Information, White

invested $5,000,000 with Wilshire Investments in the summer of 2001. Pursuant to a lawsuit and a
series of settlement agreements entered into between Jenson and White from 2003 to 2005, (a)
Jensonpaid White $6,125,000 in cash and real estate, receipt of which White acknowledged in such
agreements and in sworn testimony at Defendant's preliminary hearing in this matter, and (b) White
released all of his claims against Mr. Jenson. Accordingly, White was made whole and Mr. Jenson
owes no restitution to White.
Amended Information
13.

In connection with the plea bargain arrangement provided for below, the State of Utah

has filed an Amended Information relating to the charges to which Mr. Jenson is pleading no contest
hereunder (the "Amended Information").
DECLARATIONS
In connection with and for purposes of my no contest plea as described above:
A.

I do not contest the allegation that the investments made by Bodell, Ebeling and

White constituted "securities" under the Utah Uniform Securities Act;
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B.

I acknowledge and admit that such securities were not registered for sale in the State

ofUtah.
C.

I do not contest the allegations that (1) such securities do not constitute "federal

covered securities" under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, or (2) such securities and/or my offer and
sale thereof did not qualify for any exemption from registration under the Utah Uniform Securities
Act.
D.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford

one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of a
sentence imposed in this case maybe to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to
recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
E.

I have not waived my right to counsel.

F.

My attorney is Gregory G. Skordas, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this

statement, my rights and the consequences of my no contest plea with my attorney.
G.

I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury, and that I am

giving up that right by pleading no contest.
H.

I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the
right to compel my witnesses by subpoena at State expense to testify in court on my behalf.
I.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do so, I

cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
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J.

I understand the fact that as a defendant, I enjoy the right of a presumption of

innocence. I understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a judge or jury, or until I plead guilty or no contest. I
understand that I give up the right to the presumption of innocence if I plead no contest.
K.

I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me, my plea of not guilty

previously entered would require that the matter be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will
have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
L.

I know that, under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury, or

by the judge, that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals, and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by
the State.
M.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the offenses to which I plead

no contest, which is a fine of $5,000, 0-5 years in prison, or both, for each separate count in the
Amended Information. I know that the sentence may be for a jail or prison term, fine, or both. I
know that in addition to anyfine,an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge thereon, required by Utah
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed.
N.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for additional

amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that, if I am on probation, parole, or
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted, or to which I have plead no
contest, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
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0.

I know and understand that by pleading no contest, I am waiving my statutory and

constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs D through N.
P.

My plea of no contest is the result of a plea bargain agreement between the

prosecuting attorney and me, the terms and conditions of which are set forth below under "Plea
Agreement". I understand that my plea will be held in abeyance up to Thirty-Six (36) months for
dismissal, such abeyance period commencing on May 29, 2008.
PLEA AGREEMENT
The terms and conditions of the plea bargain agreement are as follows:
1.

Defendant Marc S. Jenson and MSF Properties and the Utah Division of Securities

shall herewith enter into a Stipulation and Consent Order (the "Division Consent Order") in the form
of Exhibit A hereto, providing for the resolution of the Division Action.
2.

Defendant shall comply, and shall cause MSF Properties to comply, with the terms

and conditions of the Division Consent Order, including the payment by Jenson or MSF to the Utah
Division of Securities, within thirty (30) days hereof, of a fine in the amount of $15,000.
3.

Within the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall pay restitution to Bodell in the amount

of $1,600,000 or an amount agreed upon by Mr. Jenson and Bodell in his discretion. Written
confirmation by Bodell to the Utah Attorney General that he has received such consideration from
Mr. Jenson shall be sufficient to evidence Mr. Jenson's satisfaction of this condition.
4.

Within the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall pay restitution to^belingin|he sunount

of $2,500,000 or an amount agreed upon by Mr. Jenson and Ebeling in his discretion. Written
confirmation by Ebeling to the Utah Attorney General that he has received such consideration from
Mr. Jenson shall be sufficient to evidence Mr. Jenson's satisfaction of this condition.
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5.

During the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall refrain from making any new "hard

money" loans as lender, whether directly or indirectly through entities owned or controlled by him.
Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Jenson shall not be prohibitedfromparticipating in the ownership,
financing and/or management of the Mount Holly Club resort development in Beaver County and
conducting or directing the business activities of such enterprise including borrowing in connection
with the Mount Holly Club project.
6.

During the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall not be convicted of any violation of

Utah state or federal law, excepting infractions and traffic citations.
7.

Mr. Jenson shall, not later than July 31 of each calendar year during the abeyance

period, provide the Attorney General's office with copies of his personal federal income tax return
filed for the calendar year ending on the previous December 31; provided that, in the event Mr.
Jenson files one or more timely requests for extension of the applicable filing date for such return,
then he shall provide the Attorney General's office with a copy of such requests not later than such
July 31 and then provide the Attorney General's office with the copies of the relevant tax return not
later than 30 days following his actual filing of suchretura. The Attorney General's office will treat
all such tax returns as confidential.
8.

Upon the entry of Defendant's no contest plea to the offenses listed above, the Court

shall dismiss with prejudice all remaining pending charges against Defendant.
9.

Upon the fulfillment of the conditions, following motion by Defendant and

opportunity for hearing, the Court, uponfindingthat all such conditions have been fulfilled, shall (a)
set aside the no contest plea and (b) dismiss with prejudice all charges against the Defendant for the
offenses listed above.
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10.

At any time following eighteen months from the commencement of this agreement

and following (a) payment of the administrative fine as required by Paragraph 2 above, (b)
satisfaction by Mr. Jenson of the requirements of Paragraph 3 above, and (c) satisfaction by Mr.
Jenson of the requirements of Paragraph 4 above, then (1) Mr. Jenson may file a motion to terminate
the abeyance early so long as Mr. Jenson has also complied (for the portion of the abeyance period
prior to such motion) with the other conditions set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 7 above, and (2) the
State will not oppose such motion for early termination so long Mr. Jenson has fully complied with
all of such conditions.
ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS
A.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea of no contest, I must do so

by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my sentencing.
B.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me

to plead no contest, and no promises except those contained herein have been made to me.
C.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand

its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I do
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
D.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

E.

I am 48 years of age; I have attended school through one year of college, and I can

read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea. I am
not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
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G.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease,
defect or impairment that would prevent mefromknowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering
my plea.
[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank - Signature Page Follows]
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Marc S. Jenson personally appeared before me this

day of May, 2008.

Notary Public
State of
County of
My commission expires
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Marc S. Jenson,
Defendant. I have reviewed this statement of Defendant and find that the declaration, including the
Statement of Facts relating to Defendant's conduct in relation to the listed offenses, is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered
Defendant. The plea negotiations are fiilly contained in the statement or as supplemented on record
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of Defendant for the offenses for which the plea is entered, and acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest

lis * w
^T day of May, 2008.
DATED this

Prosecutor

*

*

*

•

&

*

*

*

CCXA^eA

*

<%T

C>JlA^UN£.Voors.V-

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the
Defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures andfindsDefendant's plea of no contest is
freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that (1) Defendant's plea of no contest to the charges
set forth in the statement and the Amended Information be accepted and entered, and (2) each of the
charges set forth in the Original Information be dismissed with prejudice.

DONE IN COURT this

%ei

day of May, 2008.

BY THE COURT:

yU
District Court Judge Rxdpfr
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Exhibit A

Form of Division Consent Order

[Attached]

Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
Utah Attorney General
(

)

Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
Commercial Enforcement Division
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0310
FAX: (801)366-0315
Attorneys for Utah Division of Securities

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:

:

MARC SESSIONS JENSON and
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C.,

;

Respondents.

)
)

STIPULATION AND CONSENT
ORDER

)
;)

Docket No. SD-05-0039
Docket No. SD-05-0040

]

The Utah Division of Securities ("Division"), by and through its Director (actual or acting),
and Respondents MSF Properties, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF Properties" or "the
company"), and its manager Marc Sessions Jenson ("Jenson"), hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

In August 2005, the Division issued an Order to Show Cause against MSF Properties and
Jenson alleging that they may have violated Section 61-1-1 (securitiesfraud),Section 61-1-3
(sale by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent) and/or Section 61-1-7 (sale of unregistered
securities) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 etseq.

2.

Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to resolve this matter and the allegations made
in the Order to Show Cause by way of this Stipulation and Consent Order (this "Stipulation")
without further adjudicative proceedings.

3.

Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties admit the jurisdiction of the Division over them and the
subject matter of this action.

4.

By entering into this Stipulation, Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties waive any right in this
matter to (a) challenge the Division's investigation, (b) present evidence on their behalf at a
hearing, or (c) seek agency review or an appeal of this matter, administrative or judicial.

5.

Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have read this Stipulation, understand its contents, and enter
into this Stipulation voluntarily. No promises or threats have been made by the Division, nor
by any representative of the Division, to induce Mr. Jenson or MSF Properties to enter into
this Stipulation, other than as described herein.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Parties and Entities
6.

Marc Sessions Jenson ("Jenson"), age 48, is (and was at all relevant times) (a) a Utah
resident with an address of 2046 E. Normandywoods Court, Holladay, Utah 84117, and (b)
the sole manager and registered agent of MSF Properties, L.C. ("MSF Properties"), and
Wilshire Investments, LLC ("Wilshire").

7.

MSF Properties was registered with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code as a domestic limited liability company on July 21,1999. The current status of MSF is
listed as "active" and its business address is 2340 E. Phylden Dr., Holladay, Utah 84117.
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8.

Wilshire was registered with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as a
domestic limited liability company on July 23,2001. The current status of Wilshire is listed
as "active" and its business address is 2340 E. Phylden Dr., Holladay, Utah 84117.

9.

MSF Properties and Wilshire,frominception until approximately 2003, were in the business
of making commercial loans sometimes known as "hard-money lending", which involves
making short-term, high-interest loans to real estate developers and entrepreneurs seeking to
take advantage of time-critical opportunities or working to secure long-term financing.

The Division's Investigation
(Michael J. Bodell)
10.

In June 2000, Michael J. Bodell and Bodell Construction (collectively, "Bodell"), invested
$1,000,000 with MSF Properties pursuant to a "Certificate of Participation" and a "Private
Placement Agreement", in connection with which Mr. Jenson gave Bodell a personal
guaranty ("Bodell Investment #1").

11.

On August 30,2000, Bodell loaned an additional $4,000,000 to MSF Properties pursuant to a
promissory note executed by Mr. Jenson on behalf of MSF Properties, and Mr. Jenson
personally guaranteed the loan ("Bodell Investment #2").

12.

On March 18, 2003, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement
agreement resolving their dispute pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties made a
significant payment to Bodell and Bodell waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson and
MSF Properties relating to the transactions among them.

13.

In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into an agreement (the "Bodell
Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to
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provide additional consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confirmed will be satisfactory to
him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties in connection with Bodell
Investment #1 and Bodell Investment #2. Bodell has also confirmed that he fully supports
the resolution of this matter as set forth in this Stipulation and Consent Order.
(Morris K. Ebeling)
14.

In September 2000, MSF Properties received from Spencer Brannan certain funds (the
"Ebeling Funds") in the amount of $2,500,000 provided by Morris K. Ebeling ("Ebeling").

15.

Ebeling did not receive any of his funds back from Jenson. In 2003, Ebeling sued Mr.
Jenson, MSF Properties, Robbins and others in connection with his funds, pursuant to a case
in Third District Court, State of Utah, captioned Ebeling v. Jenson et ai, Civil No.
030915550 (the "Ebeling Litigation"). Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have counterclaimed
against Ebeling in the Ebeling Litigation and have also sued Robbins separately to collect on
the loan (and other subsequent loans) made by MSF Properties to Robbins.

16.

In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Ebeling entered into an agreement (the
"Ebeling Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have
agreed to provide consideration to Ebeling which Ebeling has confirmed will (a) be
satisfactory to him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson in connection with the Ebeling Funds
and (b) definitively resolve all outstanding matters in the Ebeling Litigation as between
Ebeling, on the one hand, and MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson, on the other hand. Ebeling
has also confirmed that he fully supports the resolution of this matter as set forth in this
Stipulation and Consent Order.
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(Rick C. White)
17.

In the summer of 2001, Rick C. White ("White") invested $5,000,000 with Wilshire in two
separate investments (the "White Investment").

18.

Pursuant to a series of settlement agreements entered into between Jenson and White from
2003 to 2005, (a) Jenson paid White $6,125,000 in cash and real estate, receipt of which
White acknowledged in such agreements and in sworn testimony at Defendant's preliminary
hearing in this matter, and (b) White released all of his claims against Jenson.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Statute of Limitations
19.

The alleged conduct of Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties in connection with Bodell Investment
#1 occurred outside of the statute of limitations period.

Sale of Unregistered Securities
20.

The investments made by Bodell, Ebeling and White with MSF Properties and/or Wilshire
constituted "securities" under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(x).

21.

The securities were offered without registration.

22.

The securities did not constitute "federal covered securities" within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(1)(1) and didnot qualify under any of the exemptionsfromregistration
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14.

23.

Accordingly, MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson violated Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7 with respect
to Bodell Investment #2, the Ebeling Funds and the White Investment.
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Other Matters
24.

Other matters involving Bodell Investment #2, the Ebeling Funds and the White Investment
were referred to the Office of the Attorney General. An Information wasfiledby that office
against Mr. Jenson in August 2005. In May 2008, the Attorney General's Office filed an
Amended Information in that case, and Mr. Jenson has entered into a plea bargain
arrangement with the Attorney General's Office in connection with such matters.
III. AGREEMENT

25.

Respondents MSF Properties and Marc S. Jenson neither admit nor deny the Division's
investigative Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but nonetheless consent to the entry
of an Order:
a.

Preventing Respondents from selling or offering for sale securities in any form in or
from the State of Utah until such time as the securities have been registered with the
Utah Division of Securities in accordance with Title 61, Chapter 1, UTAH CODE
ANN., unless such securities and/or such offering are exempt from such registration
requirement (1) under Section 61-1-14 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, (2) under
Blue Sky Regulation R164-14-2n of the Utah Administrative Code, (3) as a federal
covered security for which Respondents make the proper notice filings, or (4)
otherwise as permitted under Utah law;

b.

Requiring that, while engaged in or in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security, that Respondents be prohibited from:
1.

Employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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2.

Making any untrue statement of material fact, or omitting to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading;

3.

Engaging in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; and

c.

Requiring MSF Properties to pay a fine of $ 15,000 to the Division.
IV. FINAL RESOLUTION

26.

MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson acknowledge that (a) this Stipulation, upon approval by the
Division Director, will be thefinalcompromise and settlement of this matter, and (b) neither
this Stipulation nor the Order shall affect any civil causes of action that third parties may
have against Respondents arising in whole or in part from Respondents1 actions.

27.

This Stipulation and the Order (a) constitute the entire agreement between the parties herein
relating to the subject matter hereof, (b) constitute the final action of the Division with
respect to the specific matters addressed herein, and (c) supersede and cancel any and all
prior negotiations, representations, understandings, or agreements between the parties
relating to such matters.

28.

There are no verbal agreements which modify, interpret, construe, or otherwise affect this
Stipulation or the Order in any way.

29.

Respondents acknowledge that the Order does not affect any civil or arbitration proceedings
that third parties may have against Respondents arising in whole or in partfromRespondents'
actions, and that the Order does not affect any criminal causes of action that a prosecutor
might bring.
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30.

A willful material violation of this Stipulation (if and as proven in a criminal proceeding)
shall constitute a third degree felony pursuant to Section 61-1-21(1) of the Act.
[Remainder ofPage Intentionally Blank - Signature Page Follows]
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Utah Division of Securities

MSF Properties, L.C.
Marc Sessions Jenson

Date:

Date:

By:
Name:
Title:

By:
Marc Sessions Jenson, personally
and as manager of MSF Properties,
L.C.

Approved:

Assistant Attorney General
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DATED this

day of May, 2008.
Utah Division of Securities

By:
Name:
Title:
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ORDER
Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation and Consent Order above, the Director of the Utah
Division of Securities hereby enters the following orders:
1.

Respondents MSF Properties, L.C., and Marc S. Jenson are hereby Ordered to cease and
desist from:
a.

selling or offering for sale non-exempt securities in any form in orfromthe State of
Utah until such time as the securities have been registered with the Utah Division of
Securities in accordance with Title 61, Chapter 1, UTAH CODE ANN., unless such
securities and/or such offering are exempt from such registration requirement (1)
under Section 61-1-14 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, (2) under Blue Sky
Regulation R164-14~2n of the Utah Administrative Code, (3) as a federal covered
security for which Respondents make the proper notice filings, or (4) otherwise as
permitted under Utah law; and

b.

while engaged in or in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security,
1.

employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

2.

making any untrue statement of material fact, or omitting to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading;

3.

engaging in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as afraudor deceit upon any person; and

2.

Respondent MSF Properties, L.C., is also Ordered to pay a fine of $15,000 to the
Division.
10
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
(801)415-3000
(801) 415-3500 fax

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
MERRILL WEIGHT

Plaintiff,
VS.

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark
Robbins7 Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Menill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant JPMorgan

SLC_ 104492

1

Chase Bank, N A , successoi by meigei to Bank One, N A ("Bank One") joined in both of these
motions Robeit J Shelby of Buibidge Mitchell & Gioss appealed on behalf of Bodell
Constiuction Company ("Bodell") H Douglas Owens of Holland & Halt LLP appealed on
behalf of Bank One David W Tuits and Jason R Hull of Duiham Jones & Pinegai PC appealed
on behalf of Defendant Maik Robbms ("Robbms") Having leviewed the papeis filed by the
paities in suppoit and opposition to these motions, and having heaid the aiguments of counsel,
and good cause appealing, the Couit heieby FINDS and ORDERS as follows
1

Motion to Exclude Weight Robbms' Motion to Exclude Expeit Testimony of

Menill Weight is GRANTED Bodell will not be allowed to piesent testimony at tnal to
suppoit those claims foi damages that aie advanced in the expert leport of Menill Weight
lelatmg to the Benefit of the Baigam theoiy, the Modified Benefit of the Baigam theoiy, the
Reasonable Rate of Return theoiy, and claims foi Consequential Damages The Couit holds that
the defendants will suffei piejudice if Bodell weie allowed to piesent these damages theones at
tual because these claims and the bases foi them weie not disclosed duimg fact discoveiy and
defendants aie now unable to conduct fact discoveiy to lebut those theones Bodell has offeied
no legitimate excuse foi not disclosing these theones pnoi to the close of fact discoveiy Bodell
will only be allowed to piesent evidence at tnal on the one theory of damages that was
pieviously disclosed, namely, that the damages aie $4 million, less payments leceived, plus
inteiest at the statutoiy late Bodell's ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs
undei this theoiy of damages foi the alleged fiaud was not consideied by the Couit in this motion
and is theiefoie not piecluded by this oidei

SIC 104492

2

The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the
testimony of Mr. Weight on the grounds described above.
2.

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins'

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted m the alternative
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill
Weight.
3.

Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill

Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter,
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this
as

expert designated by the defendants.

>f.

//

i/ .

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August X U 0 0 7 .

/**}

-•• $n%\

2^2
Juda£ fttfirfPaul Kennedy
Thirfd/bistrict Court

?

Approved as to form:

y/(L^—
Robert J. Shelby//
Buibidge & Mitfcfiell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co. ^

SIC
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A. Beckstead
I. Douglas Owens
Holland & Hart
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N.A.

104492
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /A

day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and

foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following:

Richard D. Burbidge
Robert Shelby
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031

SLC 104492
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Tab 6

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq., (#8339)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,

:

)

>
vs.
^)
)
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
;
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, ;>
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; ] 1
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a ;
Utah limited liability company; BANK
]
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
]
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,
;
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RULE 26(a)(1) INITIAL
DISCLOSURES
Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

^

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell') hereby makes the following Initial Disclosures:
1. The name, and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting BodelFs claims, unless
solely for impeachment, and the subjects of the information are as follows:

4. Mark H. Robbins C/O Jeffrey M. Jones, Durham
Jones, & Pinegar, 111 East Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111. Mr, Robbins is believed to have
knowledge concerning his transactions with Cherokee and
Walker, his communications with, and representations made
to, Robbins, the loans that he obtained from MSF/Jenson and
his failure to pay the loans.
2. Bodell has in its possession or under its control the following categories of
documents supporting its claims:
a. Documents relating to the MSF loans and the
amounts owing thereon.
b. The August 22, 2001 letter from Ben Lightner to
"Whom It May Concern" that is attached as Exhibit A to the
Complaint.
c. Documents relating to the settlement between
Bodell, MSF and Jenson.
3. Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not yet
been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection copying all discoverable
documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is based.
4. There is no insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an
insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of the judgment that may be entered
in this case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgme^
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq. (#8339)
ROBERT J. SHELBY, Esq. (#8319)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 841111
Telephone: 801-355-6677

L O^
SEP '>

SNELL & WILMER

Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; CHEROKEE AND
WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; BANK ONE, UTAH,
national Associations, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RESPONSES TO ROBBINS' FIRST
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS
TO PLAINTIFF

Case No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's responses to Robbins' First Set of
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff.

state the amount of the loan, the entity making the loan, the entity receiving the loan, the
purpose for making the loan, and the current status of the loan.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

This information has

already been provided in response to CW's Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 and all relevant
documents have already been produced.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Describe in detail all of the damages that you

allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of how you
arrive at such damages, and identifying all witnesses, documents, or other evidence that
supports your claim for such damages.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent that it
calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports
your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without waiving the same,
Bodell responds as follows: See BodelPs responses to CW's Interrogatory No. 4. Bodell
has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell
was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell
also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also contends
that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents supporting this calculation
of damages have already been produced. Persons having knowledge of these damages
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Tab 8

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RESPONSES TO CHEROKEE &
WALKER'S REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS, FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted
in this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to

Jenson on or about March 18, 2003, and generally describe the nature of each such
individual's involvement.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Michael Bodell was involved

in the discussions and negotiations concerning the settlement and signed the agreement.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

State specifically the amount of money Bodell

contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action and explain in
detail how that amount has been calculated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Bodell contends it is entitled to

recover from Cherokee and Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the
amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount
Bodell contends Cherokee and Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also
entitled to recover interest at the legal rate.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify all individuals, other than those listed in

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, who you
believe possess any knowledge or information concerning any of the allegations in the
Complaint, and briefly describe the knowledge or information you believe each such
individual possesses.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell is unaware of any persons that may have
knowledge or information concerning the allegations of the complaint other than is stated
in the parties' Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures.
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation

)
)

PLAINTIFF BODELL
}
1
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
)
RESPONSES TO BANK ONE'S
vs.
;,
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS,
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
;'
INTERROGATORIES, AND
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, ;) REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; ])
DOCUMENTS
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a '
Utah limited liability company; BANK
~
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
)
Civil No. 030917018
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
)'
Judge William B. Bohling
50,
;
Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby responds to
Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and
Requests for Production of Documents as follows:

REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§151-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
RESPONSE:

Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages

against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank One has not been
forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right
to amend the complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery so
justify.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: For each of the foregoing Requests for Admissions
for which your response was anything other than an unequivocal admission:
a. Set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications,
and identify all documents which support or evidence the basis for not
responding with an unequivocal admission.
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts and
summarize the knowledge of each person.
RESPONSE: Not applicable.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you
have received on the $4 Million Bodell Loan and the $1 Million Bodell Loan, including
the date received, the amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all
documents constituting such payments.
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
BANK ONE'S FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby supplements its
response to Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions as follows:

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§151-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly,
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek punitive damages should
subsequent discovery justify such relief.
DATED this Q

"day of August, 2004.
BURBIDGE

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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